Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 58 | Issue 5

Article 6

6-1-1983

Government Fraud, Waste, and Abuse: A Practical
Guide to Fighting Official Corruption
Randy J. Curato
J. Daniel McCurrie

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Randy J. Curato & J. D. McCurrie, Government Fraud, Waste, and Abuse: A Practical Guide to Fighting Official Corruption, 58 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1027 (1983).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol58/iss5/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

NOTE

Government Fraud, Waste, and Abuse: A Practical
Guide to Fighting Official Corruption
While fraud, waste, and abuse continue to plague government,
Congress has passed several statutes that are useful in combating this
problem. This note discusses these statutes and their application to
government fraud. Part A discusses the Travel Act. Part B reviews
the mail fraud statute. Part C examines the Hobbs Act, and Part D
analyzes the federal bribery statute. In addition, parts E and F survey the major points involved in the conflict of interest statutes, and
RICO's use in government corruption cases.
A.

I.

THE TRAVEL ACT

Construction and Purpose

The Interstate and Foreign Travel in Aid of Racketeering Enterprises Act, more commonly known as the Travel Act', received
congressional approval in 1961, as part of United States Attorney
General Robert Kennedy's program to curb organized crime and
racketeering. 2 The Act supports state and local law enforcement ef1

18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976).
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or
(2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity; or
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion,
management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity, and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts specified in subparagraphs (1),
(2) and (3), shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than
five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section "unlawful activity" means (1) any business enterprise
involving gambling, liquor on which the Federal exise tax has not been paid, narcotics or controlled substances (as defined in section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act), or prostitution offenses in violation of the laws of the State in which
they are committed or of the United States, or (2) extortion, bribery, or arson in
violation of the laws of the State in which committed or of the United States.
(c)Investigations of violations under this section involving liquor or narcotics shall
be conducted under the supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury.
2 See Miller, The "Travel Act'" A New Stalutoty Approach to Organized Crime in the United
States, 1 DuQ. L. REv. 181, 184 (1963) (Mr. Miller was Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Criminal Division, Department of Justice, when the Travel Act was passed); Pollner,
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forts by allowing for federal prosecution of persons engaged in certain unlawful business activities. 3 In many cases, organized crime
members reside in one state and conduct their criminal operations in
another. By creating federal jurisdiction, the Travel Act controls
criminal conduct which would otherwise be beyond the authority of
state and local governments. 4 The Travel Act prohibits any person
from conducting illegal activity through use of any means or facility
of interstate commerce.
Broadly stated, the Travel Act makes it a federal offense to
travel interstate, or to use any interstate facilities, with intent to: (1)
distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; (2) commit a violent
crime in furtherance of any unlawful activity; or (3) promote or facilitate any unlawful activity. The Act defines "unlawful activity" to
include any business enterprise involving gambling, illegal liquor,
narcotics, or prostitution offenses, as well as conduct involving extortion, bribery or arson. After the defendants' unlawful activity has
been discovered, the government must prove the defendant performed one of the three types of conduct listed above. Even though
the government must produce substantial evidence to prove its case,
the Travel Act still provides the government with a valuable tool in
prosecuting political corruption cases.
A.

Legislative Histo

Congressional members initially disagreed on the scope and purpose of the Act. 5 Both houses materially modified Attorney General
Kennedy's original bill. 6 The Senate bill prohibited the travel in or

use of any facility in interstate commerce which furthered "extortion
or bribery in violation of the laws of the state in which committed or
of the United States."' 7 The House version of the bill limited its coverage of extortion and bribery activities to those connected with
Attorney CeneralRobert F Kennedy's Legislative Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering, 28
BROOKLYN L. REV. 37 (1962).
3 See United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1968), LegislationRelating to Organized Crime: HearingsBefore Subcomm. No.5of the House Comm. on theJudiciagy, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
19 (1961) [hereinafter House Hearings]; The Attorney General's Program to Curb Organized Crime and
Racketeering: HearingsBefore Senate Comm. onJudiciag,87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961) [hereinafter
Senate Hearings].
4 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 336; Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 15 and 103.
5 See generally Pollner, supra note 2, at 37.
6 S. REP. No. 644, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H. REP. No. 966, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprintedin 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2664.
7 S. REP. No. 644, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); 107 CONG. REc. 18,815 (1961).
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gambling, liquor, narcotics and prostitution offenses. 8 The ensuing
House-Senate conference resulted in compromise; the Senate version
was adopted, thus making extortion and bribery separate indictable
offenses. 9
The Senate-sponsored and approved-bill added a third element to the Travel Act. As originally drafted, the Travel Act's only
requirement was travel in or use of a facility of interstate commerce
with intent to commit one of the proscribed unlawful activities. 0 No
subsequent overt act was required. Consequently, one Senator commented that the Travel Act created crimes out of pure intent unaccompanied by subsequent action." In the final version of the Act,
therefore, Congress included a requirement that the defendant must
have committed an overt act in furtherance of the scheme.' 2 This
3
version of the Act subsequently became law in 1961.1
As originally proposed, the Travel Act contained two sections,
one section covering travel and one section covering transportation
in interstate commerce.14 In reviewing the Senate bill, the House
combined these two sections, purportedly attempting to "tidy up"
the language.' 5 The House-approved language extended the Act's
coverage to "whoever travels in interstate commerce or uses anyfacliy
in interstate commerce."' 6 Though innocent on its face, this change
greatly expanded the Travel Act's scope. Apparently neither the
8 H. REP. No. 966, 87th Cong., IstSess., reprintedin 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2664.
9 107 CONG. REC. 18,815 (1961). The Justice Department had sent a letter to the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee after reading the House approved bill. Deputy Attorney General White objected that the House bill "removes from the purview of the bill,
bribery of state, local, and federal officials". See United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 292
(1968). After receiving White's letter, the House agreed to the Senate version. Id.
10 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 9.
11 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 252 and 328; Miller, supra note 2, at 185. But see House
Hearings,supra note 3, at 336-37 (Assistant Attorney General Miller testified that the Travel
Act does not punish purely intent, since the proposed bill requires that intent be proven by
referring to some overt conduct).
12 Senator Ervin and Assistant Attorney General Miller extensively debated the necessity
of an overt act requirement. Senator Ervin's tenacity finally forced Miller's capitulation. See
Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 251-60.
13 See United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 293 (1968); United States v. Archer, 486
F.2d 670, 679 (2d Cir. 1973); H. REP. No. 966, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1961 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2664; S. REP. No. 644, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H. REP. No.
1161, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); 107 CONG. REc. 18,814-15 (1961).
14 107 CONG. REC. 13,942-43 (1961).
15 H. REP. No. 966, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2664; 107 CONG REC. 16,541 (1961).
16 Id. See also United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d at 679 n.10.
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House 17 nor the conference committee 18 recognized the implications
of this change. As submitted by Robert Kennedy, the bill covered
only interstate travel.' 9 As passed by Congress and interpreted by
the courts, however, the present bill covers not only interstate travel,
but also interstate telephone calls and any use of communication
20
devices.
B. Purpose of the Travel Act
The principal purpose of the Travel Act is to aid local law enforcement officials in their battle against organized crime figures who
travel between states to avoid apprehension. 2 ' Since the Travel Act's
express purpose is to control organized crime, those outside an organized crime network appear safe from prosecution. The courts, however, have not limited the Act to persons involved in organized
22
crime.
The courts generally delineate the type of conduct proscribed in
section 1952(b) by analyzing the term "business enterprise." Congress has defined, and the courts have interpreted, this term to mean
a "continuous course of conduct." Under this analysis, isolated violations would not be included in the business enterprise definition,
since they do not constitute a "continuous course of conduct. '23 In
categorizing Travel Act offenses, the courts quickly noted that the
"business enterprise" requirement is found only in section 1952(b) (1),
which relates only to gambling, narcotics, liquor, and prostitution
offenses. "Business enterprise" is not used in conjunction with extor17 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2664 (emphasis added) ("[T]he amendment combines ... sections 1 and 2 of the bill as it was passed by the Senate but makes no substantial
change in the provisions of the bill.") (emphasis supplied).
18 107 CONG. REc. 18,815 (1961) ( "[T]he amendment ... merely adds a new section).
See generaly Pollner, supra note 2, at 38-42; Miller, supra note 2, at 190-91.
19 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 9.
20 One of the first courts to discuss this amendment held that Congress, by combining the
two sections, effectively included the telephone within the definition of the term "facility."
United States v. Borgese, 235 F. Supp. 286, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). See also United States v.
Villano, 529 F.2d 1046, 1052 n.6 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976); United States v.
Kelly, 395 F.2d 727, 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 963 (1968).
21 See note 3supra. See also United States v. Wander, 601 F.2d 1251, 1257 (3d Cir. 1979).
22 Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 247 n.21 (1972) (the Supreme Court stated
"the reach of the statute clearly was not limited to. . . organized criminal activity'); United
States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 885 n.5 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971) ("[T]he
statute applies to all persons and not only to persons engaged in organized crime').
23 United States v. Kaiser, 660 F.2d 724, 731 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 956 (1981);
United States v. Donaway, 447 F.2d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1971); H. REP. No. 966, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess.,reprintedin U.S. CONG. CODE & AD. NEWS 2664, 2666, 107 Cong. Rec. 13,945 (1961).
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tion, bribery, or arson under section 1952 (b)(2). 2 4 The omission of
"business enterprise" from section 1952(b)(2) allows a public official
to be prosecuted for extortion or bribery without first meeting the
enterprise continuity requirement. While the Travel Act's original
purpose may have been to fight organized crime of a continuous and
long-term nature, prosecutors today can employ the Act to fight nonorganized crimes, such as political corruption. In short, bribery of
political officials need not be part of a "continuous course of
conduct."
II.

Elements of the Offense

The Travel Act reaches anyone who: (1) travels in or uses a facility of interstate commerce with intent to promote or facilitate unlawful activity; and (2) who thereafter actually performs or attempts to
perform an act in furtherance of those activities. 25 Though passed by
Congress in 1961, the Travel Act was not extensively employed by
26
prosecutors to combat political corruption until the mid-seventies.
In some respects, courts have treated political and non-political corruption prosecutions similarly. 27 Certain elements available under
section 1952, however, receive special treatment in political trials. 28
A.

Travel in or Use of a Faclity of Interstate Commerce

The use of an interstate facility or means of interstate travel to
promote an unlawful activity provides federal courts with jurisdic29
tion over crimes which would otherwise require local prosecution.
Travel Act liability can attach even though a defendant does not
30
reasonably foresee that he will be engaged in interstate activity.
24 United States v. Wander, 601 F.2d 1251, 1257 (3rd Cir. 1979); United States v. Gooding, 473 F.2d 425,427 (5th Cir.),cert.denied, 412 U.S. 928*(1973); United States v. Mahler, 442
F.2d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir.), cen. denied, 404 U.S. 993 (1971).
25 United States v. Jones, 642 F.2d 909, 912 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Stevens, 612
F.2d 1226, 1231 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1979).
26 United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978); United
States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976); United States v.
Peskin, 527 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1975),cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976); United States v. Rauhoff,
525 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied,
417 U.S. 976 (1974); United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1974).
27 Compare United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974) (prosecution of a former Illinois governor), with United States v. O'Dell, 671 F.2d 191
(6th Cir. 1982) (prosecution of a massage parlor operator).
28 See notes 33-37 injfa and accompanying text.
29 United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455, 489 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978);
United States v. Peskin, 527 F.2d 71, 78 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976).
30 Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971).
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Likewise, a defendant may be convicted under the Travel Act without proof that he knowingly caused interstate travel or use of an interstate facility.3 1 The Travel Act, however, does require that the
defendant use an interstate means, intending to promote or carry on
32
an unlawful activity.
In a federal prosecution under section 1952, courts must analyze
33
the connection between the illegal scheme and interstate element.
A major area of disagreement among the circuits concerns the required degree of interrelationship between these two components.
Some courts hold a minimal relationship will suffice, 34 while others
require a more direct and substantial connection.3 5 Interestingly,
with one exception, 36 courts in political corruption trials have ad37
hered to the more stringent jurisdictional nexus requirement.
The jurisdictional test in a political corruption case requires the
court to examine the nature and degree of interstate activity associated with the state law crime. 38 Generally stated, if the travel in or
use of interstate facilities is more than "minimal, incidental, [or] fortuitous,"

39

this jurisdictional test is satisfied.

The first court to clearly articulate the Travel Act's jurisdic40
tional requirement was the Seventh Circuit in UnitedStates v. Isaacs.
The Isaacs court held that the fortuitous use of interstate commerce
will not satisfy the Travel Act's jurisdiction requirement. 4' Hence,
when an essentially local bribe is funded by a check cleared through
31 Peskin, 527 F.2d at 78; United States v. LeFaivre, 507 F.2d 1288, 1297 (4th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975).
32 Craig, 573 F.2d at 489.
33 See generally White-Collar Crime. Second Annual Survey of the Law, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
173, 341 (1981) [hereinafter cited as White-Collar Crime].
34 United States v. Alsobrook, 620 F.2d 139 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 847 (1980);
United States v. Wander, 601 F.2d 1251 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. LeFaivre, 507 F.2d
1288 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975).
35 United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976);
United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); United
States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973).
36 United States v. Wechsler, 392 F.2d 344 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 932 (1968).
37 See note 26 supra.
38 Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1148.
39 Id. at 1146.
40 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cer. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). Isaacs involved the prosecution of two individuals, a former Illinois governor and a former Illinois Revenue Director, for
accepting bribes for their political influence on behalf of certain Illinois racing interests. Id. at
1131. The prosecution predicated federal jurisdiction upon evidence that three checks drawn
and deposited in Illinois at an Illinois bank were cleared through the Federal Reserve Bank in
St. Louis, Missouri. Id. at 1146.
41 The Seventh Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Rewis v. United
States, 401 U.S. 808 (1970).
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the Federal Reserve System, the interstate commerce is too fortui-

tous. 42 The government, moreover, cannot "create" the necessary ju-

risdiction by, for example, making interstate phone calls to a
suspected Travel Act offender.
Prosecutions under the Travel Act may also be premised upon
43
the interstate activities of a defendant's agents or employees.
Therefore, aides or personal representatives may inculpate a public
official who counsels them to commit a section 1952(b) violation
while using interstate means. The federal aiding and abetting statute" has been used to obtain Travel Act convictions against those
45
encouraging unlawful activity.

In a recent political corruption case, United States v. Clark,46 an
Arkansas county judge was convicted under the Travel Act upon
proof that his representative traveled in interstate commerce to promote an unlawful bribery scheme. The defendant, Clark, received
kickbacks and rebates from suppliers based on the amount of orders
he placed with their firms.4 7 Clark felt the evidence failed to show he
had either induced or caused the supplier to carry on unlawful activity by interstate means. 48 Clark admitted the supplier traveled interstate to participate in the bribery scheme. According to Clark,
42 The court reasoned that "were the § 1952 counts here to be upheld the federal-state
balance would be seriously upset." 493 F.2d at 1147. The Second Circuit's jurisdictional test
requires use of interstate facilities to be more than a "casual [or] incidental occurrence."
United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 682 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Corallo, 413 F.2d
1303, 1325 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969). Archer concerned the federal investigation of corruption in the New York criminal justice system. In organizing a bribery attempt,
several interstate phone calls were made, but none were initiated by the defendant. These
interstate calls were placed by federal investigators admittedly to provide jurisdiction for a
Travel Act indictment. The Second Circuit stressed that these calls, serving no purpose not
equally served by an in-state call, were too "casual and incidental" to support federal jurisdiction. 486 F.2d at 674. The court held the interstate calls "insufficient to transform this sordid, federally provoked incident of local corruption into a crime against the United States."
Id. at 683.
43 See generalv Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 813 (1970).
44 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976): "(a) whoever commits an offense against the Unites States or
aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal."
45 United States v. Dean, 647 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2296 (1982);
United States v. Alsobrook, 620 F.2d 139 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980); United
States v. Prince, 529 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 838 (1976).
46 646 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1981).
47 In Arkansas, county judges serve in an administrative or executive capacity. One of
the county judge's duties is to approve and authorize payment of county bills and accounts.
Id at 1260.
48 The supplier's principal place of business was in Memphis, Tennessee, and oi several
occasions he had traveled to Arkansas to pay Clark his "commission." Id. at 1267.
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however, it does not therefore follow that he had actually induced
49
the interstate travel.
Clark compared his situation to the one presented the Supreme
Court in Rewi v. United States.50 In Rewis, the Court reversed a
Travel Act conviction, finding no jurisdictional nexus between the
alleged interstate travel and the defendant's illegal activity.51 The
lower court grounded jurisdiction upon the interstate travel of a
gambling operation's customers. Writing for the court, Justice Marshall stated that the Travel Act requires more for jurisdiction than
the travel of a customer patronizing unlawful activities. 52 The
Clark court, distinguishing Rewis, held that the supplier was more
than a mere customer of the bribery scheme. 53 The supplier instead
played an integral and vital part in the scheme's success.
A Travel Act prosecution based on the interstate activities of
someone other than the defendant may also be grounded in conspiracy theory. 54 One member of a conspiracy attributed with his coconspirator's interstate travel may face a substantive Travel Act conviction. In United States v. Peskin 55 a lawyer served as the middleman
in a bribery scheme involving a real estate development company
(K&B) and several members of an Illinois zoning board.5 6 The government maintained that the jurisdictional nexus was met when the
K&B vice-president (Stulberg) traveled from Detroit to Chicago in
order to promote the bribery scheme. 57 Peskin argued that the travel
could not be attributed to him since there was no proof that he had
caused or induced the travel. 58 The court rejected this argument.
Under conspiracy theory, members are liable for all acts, whether or
59
not committed by themselves, which further criminal conduct.
Since Stulberg's travel from Detroit to Chicago furthered the illegal
bribery scheme, Peskin could also be held liable. 6°
49 Id.
50 401 U.S. 808 (1970).
51 Id. at 814.
52 Id. at 811.
53 646 F.2d at 1268.
54 For use of conspiracy theory in political corruption cases, see United States v. Craig,
573 F.2d 455 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978); United States v. Peskin, 527 F.2d 71
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S 818 (1976); United States v. Rauhoff, 525 F.2d 1170 (7th
Cir. 1975).
55 527 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976).
56 Id. at 74.
57 Id. at 75.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 76.
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Intent to Promote, Manage, Establish, or Facilitatean Unlawful
Activity

The Travel Act requires intent to promote or facilitate unlawful
activity.6 1 The statute does not expressly require that the defendant
intend to use interstate facilities. 62 The Travel Act thus proscribes
intent to promote unlawful activity through interstate means, not the
intent to use interstate means to promote unlawful activity.
In United States v. Graham ,63 defendant Graham, a Seattle politician, violated the Travel Act by 1teceiving $5,000 in exchange for exerting his political influence in an engineering contract negotiation.
In a phone conversation with Graham, an engineering company representative agreed to pay Graham "influence" money upon the latter's next visit to Washington, D.C. 64 The court ruled that Graham
had intended to facilitate the bribery scheme by traveling interstate. 65 Graham was convicted even though he did not intend to
travel interstate to facilitate the bribery's commission. In sum, courts
hold that the Travel Act proscribes intent to facilitate unlawful activity, not intent to travel interstate.
While defendant's intent to promote unlawful activity must be
proved, the defendant's intent to violate state law is not usually relevant in Travel Act cases. 66 The Travel Act does not require the defendant to commit the underlying state crime. 6 7 The Travel Act
crime is the use of interstate facilities to further an unlawful activity,
not the violation of state law.6
C. Overt Act Requirement
The Travel Act contains an overt act requirement. 69 Under this
requirement, anyone conducting unlawful activities in New York
who travels to Florida must not only have the requisite criminal intent but also must commit an act furthering those unlawful activities
after traveling to Florida. These "thereafter acts" need not be com61

18 U.S.C. § 1952 (a).

62 See, e.g., Clark, 646 F.2d at 1268 n.16; United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1980); Peskin, 527 F.2d at 78.
63 581 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1978).
64 Id. at 790.
65 Id.
66 Peskin, 527 F.2d at 77; Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1148. But see United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d
313, 329-30 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976). See generally White-Collar Crime, supra
note 3, at 345.
67 Peskin, 527 F.2d at 79 n.3.
68 Id.
69 See notes 10-13 supra and accompanying text.
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mitted in the destination state70 and, standing alone, they may be
perfectly legal. 7' These acts must occur, as their name implies, after
the travel in or use of interstate facilities. Even though it may sometimes be difficult to determine whether these acts have occurred, the
courts have been willing to find any act, whether or not fundamental
to the illegal scheme, a "thereafter act," as long as it was intended to
72
further the unlawful activity.

III.

Defenses

Several defenses have been raised in Travel Act trials. These
defenses have met with mixed results.
One defense that has been raised in Travel Act trials is the
"pure" intent defense. The motives for interstate travel are often diverse and numerous. Since an intent to facilitate unlawful activity is
required under the Travel Act, defendants argue that this means
"pure" intent. If not motivated for solely corrupt purposes, therefore, there can be no Travel Act conviction.
The courts have rejected this argument. 73 They have held that
travel motivated by two or more purposes, some lying outside the
Travel Act's scope, will not preclude conviction under the Act if the
requisite intent is also present. 74 The courts have based these decisions on their inability to find anything in the Act's legislative history
or purpose to suggest that Congress intended to include a so-called
"mixed motive" defense. Since Congress said nothing, the courts
have refrained from reading any such congressional limitation into
75
the Travel Act.

Entrapment theory has also been used as a defense in Travel Act
cases. A successful entrapment defense requires proof that the gov70 Peskin, 527 F.2d at 78; United States v. Wechsler, 392 F.2d 344, 347 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 932 (1968).
71 Craig, 573 F.2d at 489.
72 Peskin, 527 F.2d at 78. United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 820 (1978), involved a conspiracy to bribe several Illinois legislators. The object of the
bribe was to increase the amount of cement which trucks could haul on Illinois roads. A coconspirator trucked from Chicago to Indianapolis to solicit and collect financial support for
the bribe. Though unsuccessful, upon his return to Chicago the co-conspirator continued his
efforts to raise bribe money. The court ruled that these activities satisfied the "thereafter act"
requirement, since the co-conspirator's travel included the requisite intent. 573 F.2d at 489.
73 United States v. Graham, 581 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Peskin, 527
F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976).
74 Claiming that interstate travel or use of interstate facilities served a dual purpose, one
legal and one illegal, does not require dismissing Travel Act charges. 581 F.2d at 790; 527
F.2d at 75.
75 Id.
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ernment created a criminal situation solely to induce a defendant's
participation. 76 Before joining this contrived criminal scheme, the de77
If
fendant must not have been predisposed toward similar activity.

the defendant would have committed the crime regardless of the government "baiting," no entrapment defense exists.
Several Travel Act defendants have claimed the government
either orchestrated interstate travel or placed interstate phone calls
in order to induce unlawful activity falling within the statute's jurisdiction. Courts addressing this issue have uniformly held that if the
government initiates or manufactures the interstate element, a
78
Travel Acd conviction will not stand.
The Travel Act has withstood numerous constitutional challenges. 79 Those courts addressing the Act's constitutionality have
held the Travel Act to be a valid exercise of the federal commerce
power and have found that it does not infringe upon the powers reserved to the states by the tenth amendment. 80 The Travel Act has
also withstood scrutiny under the fifth amendment. The defendants
in a number of early cases argued that the Travel Act's wording was
vague and ambiguous, thus rendering enforcement a denial of due
process of law. These early courts, however, uniformly held that the
Travel Act was sufficiently definite and certain to warn of the proscribed activities. Because the Act provides a clear standard of conduct, it does not violate the fifth amendment.8 1 Some defendants
have also asserted that the Act infringes upon first amendment freedoms. They have argued that, by regulating the use of interstate
communication facilities, the Travel Act abridges freedom of speech.
76 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTr, CRIMINAL LAW 371 (1972).
77 Id. at 373.
78 In United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973), federal agents devised a
scheme to elicit criminal activity from within New York's criminal justice system. Furthering
the scheme, agents staged a fictitious arrest, falsified arrest records, and crossed state lines
solely to provide jurisdiction under the Travel Act. In upholding the entrapment argument,
Archer emphasized that two of the three interstate calls that served as the jurisdictional nexus
resulted from government plants of misinformation. The calls would not have been made
without the government's initiative. In effect, the government entrapped the defendant into
using interstate facilities, forcing the court to reverse the conviction. See also United States v.
Bagnorial, 665 F.2d 877, 898 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2040 (1982); Hall 536 F.2d
at 327.
79 See generally White-Collar Crime, supra note 33, at 349; Annot., 1 A.L.R. FED. 838, 847861 (1969).
80 Gilstrap v. United States, 389 F.2d 6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968); United
States v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.), cer. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1968); Marshall v. United
States, 355 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 815 (1968).
81 Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d 871 (8th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 393 U.S. 410
(1967); United States v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1968).
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Courts have consistently upheld the Travel Act in face of these assertions, since the first amendment does not protect unlawful speech. 82
IV.

Conclusion

The Travel Act's interpretation by the courts and use by federal
prosecutors has undergone substantial change over the past twenty
years. From passage in 1961 until approximately 1971, political officials were not prosecuted under the Travel Act. Since then, however,
prosecutors and courts alike have found the Travel Act to be another
valuable weapon in their continuing battle against the debilitating
effects of political corruption.
B.

THE MAIL FRAUD ACT: SECTION

I.

1341

Construction and Purpose

The mail fraud statute prohibits use of the United States mails
to further unlawful and fraudulent schemes.8 3 To establish a mail
fraud violation, the government must first prove that an individual
devised a scheme to defraud, and second, that he implemented the
84
scheme using the United States mails.
An essential component of mail fraud is the specific intent to
defraud. The defendant need not intend to use the mails, but he
must intend to commit a fraudulent scheme.8 5 By requiring proof of
specific intent, Congress created a complete defense to mail fraud82 United States v. Lockretis, 385 F.2d 487 (7th Cir.), vacatedon other grounds, 390 U.S. 338
(1967), rev'don other grounds, 398 F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1968).
83 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away,
distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious
coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or
delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or
thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction
thereon, or the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person whom it is
addresed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
84 Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 9 (1954); United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d 406,
410 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1358 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 961 (1979).
85 Curry, 681 F.2d at 410; United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976).
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good faith. A defendant's good faith intention not to defraud will
86
bar conviction under the mail fraud statute.
Courts have defined "scheme to defraud" in an expansive manner. As one judge remarked, the law does not require a definition of
fraud, since its versatility is limited only by human ingenuity. 8 7 No
matter how imaginative or innovative the scheme, if the elements of
common law fraud are met, a conviction may result.
A.

Legislative Histogy

The mail fraud statute, originally enacted in 1872, has enjoyed a
long and respected existence.8 8 The legislative history surrounding
the passage of the statute, however, is sparse.8 9 The 1872 Act provided penalties for anyone who devised a scheme to defraud while
intending to use the mails to execute the plan and who thereafter
actually mailed a letter.9° Persons guilty under this provision could
be fined up to $500 and imprisoned for eighteen months.
Congress amended the mail fraud statute in 1889 and specifically proscribed several fraudulent activities. 9 ' The 1889 amendment also greatly expanded the statute's scope, adding five
significant new words. The original Act required the defendant to
have actually used the United States mails. After 1889, however, a
person placing a letter in or causing the use of the U.S. mails to further
a scheme to defraud violated the mail fraud statute. 92 Prosecutors
using the mail fraud statute between 1872 and 1909, therefore, had
to prove three elements: (1) a scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) an
86 Cuny, 681 F.2d at 410; United States v. Goss, 650 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Sherer, 653 F.2d 334 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1034 (1981).
87 See Judge Holmes' majority opinion in Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 687 (1941).
88 In a recent law review article, a former federal prosecutor remarked:
[t]o federal prosecutors of white-collar crime, the mail fraud statute is our Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart-and our true love. We
may flirt with RICO, show off with IOb-5, and call conspiracy law 'darling', but we
always come home to the virtues of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, with its simplicity, adaptability, and comfortable familiarity.
Rakoff, The FederalMail FraudStatute , 18 Duo. L. REv. 771 (1980).
89 United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1248 (8th Cir. 1976) ("The legislative history, which may have given some insight into the congressional considerations underlying the
statute, is sparse.") See also, Morano, The MailFraudStatute: A rocrustean Bed, 14 J. MAR. L.
REV., 45, 45-47 (1980).
90 Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323 (1872).
91 Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 1, 25 Stat. 873 (1889). The numerous counterfeit
schemes and swindles enumerated in the statute's text under this revision caused one author
to call them a "laundry list" of.fraudulent activities. Morano, supra note 89, at 45-46.
92 Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 1, 25 Stat. 873 (1889).
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intent to use the mails to effect this scheme, and (3) actual use of the
93
mails, evidenced by either the receipt or mailing of a letter.
The mail fraud statute underwent another fundamental change
in 1909. In its 1909 amendment, Congress removed the words "to be
effected by opening or intending to open correspondence," which
had followed the scheme to defraud element. 94 With this amendment Congress eliminated the intent requirement. 95 Thus, the mail
fraud statute may now be used not only to prosecute individuals who
scheme to use the mails with intent to defraud, but also to prosecute
by accident or dethose individuals scheming to defraud who, either
96
sign, use the mails while pursuing this scheme.
B.

Purpose of the Mail FraudStatute

The legislative history does not conclusively indicate Congress'
purpose in enacting the mail fraud statute. 9 7 As a result, courts have
had to discern the purpose and reach of the statute, guided only by
the statute's expansive language. 98 The early courts viewed the statute as having a dual purpose. First, the statute was designed to prevent fraudulent misuse of the U.S. mails, regardless of whether or not
the scheme to defraud violated state law. 99 Second, and more importantly, courts held that the statute was enacted to protect the public
from fraudulent schemes and devices.100
The statute covers two types of schemes: those intended to deprive individuals of money and other tangible property interests,' 0 '
93 Stokes v. United States, 157 U.S. 187, 189 (1895).
94 Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1139 (1909).
95 United States v. Young, 232 U.S. 155, 161 (1913). The Young court cited precedent for
this abrupt change, x pare King, 200 F. 622 (N.D Ga. 1912) and United States v. Maxey,
200 F. 997 (E.D. Ark. 1912).
96 See generally Morano, supra note 89, at 46-47 n.2. The mail fraud statute has been
amended three more times since 1909. None of these amendments, however, are of major
consequence. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1341, 62 Stat. 763 (1948); Act of May 24,
1949, ch. 139, § 34, 63 Stat. 94 (1949); Act of Aug. 12, 1970, Pub. L. 91-375, § 6(j)(10), 84
Stat. 778 (1970).
97 See note 89 supra.
98 McNueie, 536 F.2d at 1248.
99 Badder v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393 (1916) ("The overt act of putting a letter
into the post office . . . is a matter that Congress may regulate. Whatever the limits to its
power, it may forbid any. . . acts done in furtherance of a scheme it regards as contrary to
public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not." See also United States v. States, 488
F.2d 761, 767 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974).
100 Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896); Keane, 522 F.2d at 544. Seegenerally Note, Surq ofthe Law of Mail Fraud, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 237, 239-240.
101 United States v. Britton, 500 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1974)(insurance fraud); United States
v. Street, 529 F.2d 226 (6th Cir. 1976)(check kiting fraud); Kloian v. United States, 349 F.2d
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and those intended to deprive individuals of certain intangible political and civil rights.10 2 The majority of political corruption cases fall
within this. second category of cases.
II.

Elements of the Offense: Mail Fraud

Since 1909, two elements have been necessary for a mail fraud
violation: the formation of a scheme with intent to defraud and the
use of the mails to further that scheme.10 3 The use of the mails need
not be essential to the scheme's success. 10 4 While specific state law
violations are indictable under the mail fraud statute, alleging a state
law offense is not required for conviction. 0 5 The fraudulent scheme
need not succeed for there to be a mail fraud violation. 10 6 Further,
mail fraud convictions are not precluded because the unlawful
scheme failed to defraud its victims.

0

7

Under the mail fraud statute,

each mailing in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme creates a separate indictable offense. 10 8
A.

Intent to Devise a Scheme to Defraud

Since the enactment of the mail fraud statutes in 1872, Congress
has neither defined nor established precise limits for the words
"scheme or artifice to defraud."' 0 9 Congress' failure to enunciate the
statute's purpose in the legislative history has forced the courts to
291 (5th Cir. 1965)(credit card fraud); United States v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 829 (1975) (securities fraud).
102 United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Curry, 681
F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 445
U.S. 961 (1979); United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Brown, 540 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied,
417 U.S. 976 (1974); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973),cert.denied, 417 U.S.
909 (1974).
103 Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954); Cury, 681 F.2d at 410; Keane, 522 F.2d
at 544.
104 347 U.S. at 8.
105 Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1361; MfeNeive, 536 F.2d at 1247 n.2; Keane, 522 F.2d at 544;
United States v. Edwards, 458 F.2d 875, 880 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 891 (1972).
106 Keane, 522 F.2d at 545; United States v. Shavin, 287 F.2d 647, 651-52 (7th Cir. 1961).
107 United States v. Barber, 688 F.2d 778, 785 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Goss, 650
F.2d 1336 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bassler, 651 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied,
454 U.S. 1151 (1982).
108 Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916). See also SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, A.B.A., THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF RICO AND MAIL FRAUD CASES 7
(1980) (remarks of Richard Beckler on August 14, 1979 at the A.B.A. Annual Meeting, Dallas,
Texas).
109 Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1360; McNeive, 536 F.2d at 1248.
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determine the statute's scope. Early in the history of the mail fraud
statute, an attempt was made to limit the definition of the phrase
"scheme to defraud.""10 Proponents for limiting the statute suggested that common law fraud principles should be used to define the
parameters of "scheme to defraud."' 1 Under this narrow interpretation, the mail fraud statute would only have applied in schemes involving misrepresentations of existing facts. Individuals making false
promises or suggestions about future conduct or events could not
have been prosecuted under the mail fraud statute, even though they
intended to defraud.
In an 1896 decision, the Supreme Court rejected this argument.112 The Court felt that limiting the statute's scope to common
law fraud schemes would contradict congressional intent. According
to the Court, Congress intended to prohibit all attempts to defraud
through the use of any form of misrepresentation." 13 Since 1896, the
14
courts have thus broadly defined "scheme to defraud."
The broadest reading of the words "scheme to defraud" is found
in political corruption cases. 115 For many years, political officials
who deprived citizens of tangible interests, such as money or property, have been prosecuted under the mail fraud statute. 1 6 Recent
political corruption cases have also found mail fraud actionable,
however, absent any loss of a citizen's money or property. 1 7 These
cases follow one of two different scenarios. The first occurs when politicians fail to disclose a conflict of interest in matters under their
political authority."18 Courts have found that this failure defrauds
the public of its right to a government free from corruption, fraud,
and dishonesty. The second scenario occurs when a politician makes
a statement to a public body in order to personally benefit f-rom a
110 Durland v.United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
111
d. at 312.
112 Id. at 312-13.
113 Id. at 313.
114 United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 544 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976
(1976); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909
(1974).
115 For further discussion of this development, see Note, A Survey of the Mail FraudAct, 8
MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 673 (1978); Comment, The Intangible-RightsDoctrineand PoliticalCoruption
Prosecutions Under the FederalMail FraudStatute, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 562 (1980).
116 See, e.g., Bradford v. United States, 129 F.2d 274 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 317 U.S. 683
(1942); Leche v. United States, 118 F.2d 246 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 617 (1941); Shushan v.United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1942).
117 See note 102 supra.
118 United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976);
United States v.Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976).
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program currently under consideration. 19 This scheme deprives citizens of the honest and faithful participation of a public official in
governmental affairs.
The breadth of the "scheme to defraud" language is measured
by the intangible rights doctrine. Though discussed in earlier
cases,1 20 the intangible rights doctrine did not receive extensive judicial evaluation until 1973 in UnitedStatesv. States.' 2 1 In that case, two
candidates for St. Louis committeeman falsified voter registration affidavits and cast fraudulent absentee ballots in an attempt to crig"2
the election.12 2 Appealing their conviction, the former committeemen argued that the express language of the mail fraud statute
mandates finding an offense only if the fraudulent scheme involved
money or property interests. The defendants claimed that the first
phrase of the mail fraud statute, "scheme or artifice to defraud,"
must be read in conjunction with the second phrase, "obtaining
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises." 12 3 Under this construction "money or property" limits "scheme to defraud," thereby undercutting the
foundation for the intangible rights theory. The court found no support for this argument in either legislative history or case law. The
more natural construction, according to the court, was to view the
phrases as independent from, rather than complementary to, each
other. 124
In later cases this argument was expressed in terms of constructive fraud.12 5 Defendants prosecuted under the mail fraud statute for
intangible rights violations argued that, absent monetary or property
loss, any breach of a fiduciary duty would amount to no more than
constructive fraud. Since the mail fraud statute does not cover constructive fraud, the defendants claimed that they had been wrongly
convicted. 1 26 Facing this challenge, courts devised a two-part test for
determining if an infringement upon intangible rights is indictable
119 United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964
(1975); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
120 See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 458 F.2d 875 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 891
(1972); United States v. Faser, 303 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1969). See generalo' Coffee, From
Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalizationof FidciagBreaches and the ProblematicLine
Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. GRIM. L. REV. 117, 129-30 (1981).
121 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974).
122 Id. at 762-63.
123 Id. at 763-64.
124 Id. at 764. For criticism of this interpretation, see Comment, supra note 115, at 570-72.
125 See Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1359-60; Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1149.
126 Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1149.
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under the mail fraud statute. First, there must be a breach of a
fiduciary duty and second, some evidence of actionable fraud must
exist. 127

A breach of fiduciary duty by a public official, standing alone, is
not enough to support a mail fraud conviction. 128 Failure to disclose
a conflict of interest entails a breach of a fiduciary duty but does not
necessarily involve actionable mail fraud. A conflict of interest
could support a mail fraud conviction only if coupled with a material
misstatement or omission of an operative fact.1 29 For example, a
public official may have a personal interest in some property currently up for rezoning. Assuming the mails were used, the official
would violate the mail fraud statute only if he either lied to the public or failed to disclose his competing material interest in the
property.
Recently, one court has had to determine the extent of the
fiduciary relationship between the public and government officials.130 The court had to decide if public officials, whether or not
elected, were subject to a fiduciary obligation concerning possible
conflicts of interest. An expansive reading of the mail fraud statute
risked including under its coverage people who participated in the
political process only to a limited extent-such as lobbyists and minor party functionaries. 131 A restrictive interpretation, however,
would preclude, as a matter of law, the prosecution of non-elected
127 Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1363; Bush, 522 F.2d at 647.
128 United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1976). McNeive involved the mail
fraud prosecution of a former St. Louis plumbing inspector. The government alleged that the
inspector had received a five-dollar gratuity for every plumbing permit application he
processed. The court ruled there could be no mail fraud conviction since no evidence was
presented showing the inspector to have materially misrepresented any facts to insure that the
gratuities continued. There was also no evidence that the inspector actively concealed his
receipt of the gratuities. Even though receiving the gratuities was arguably a breach of the
inspector's duty to the public, that could not by itself support a mail fraud conviction. Id. at
1251.
129 See, e.g., United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977
(1976). Bush was a former press secretary for Chicago's Mayor Daley. Bush actively concealed and materially misstated his interest in an advertising firm which was subsequently
awarded a city contract. This conflict of interest, coupled with the material misrepresentations he made to Mayor Daley, were enough to prosecute him for mail fraud. Id. at 648. In
United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976), Keane,
a city alderman, used his position to secure preferential treatment for properties in which he
had an undisclosed interest. When voting on matters affecting his property, Keane actively
concealed his interest from the other aldermen. The court found this intentional conduct
defrauded Keane's constituents of their right to his loyal and honest services. Id. at 546.
130 United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982).
131 Id. at 120.
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officials even if they exerted substantial "de facto" control of govern13 2
mental processes.
The court posited two tests for determining the measure of
133
fiduciary status-the reliance test and the de facto control test.
Under the reliance test, a court examines the extent to which people
rely upon a particular official. If an official is relied upon to a substantial extent, his non-elected status will not eliminate his fiduciary
obligation to the public. 134 The de facto control test, on the other
hand, examines whether a person makes governmental decisions. If a
person, through de facto power, makes decisions affecting governmental policy, he will be considered in a fiduciary relationship with
the public. 13 5 The second test closely parallels the corporate law
13 6
treatment afforded "de facto" corporate officers and directors.
Even though the officer may not have been officially elected, he can
still be held under a fiduciary obligation to shareholders if he exerts
substantial control over the corporation's affairs. 137 These tests create a "safe harbor" for the party official motivated by strictly partisan reasons.' 38 By employing these tests, courts can distinguish
between government business and purely political party affairs. The
official can act without fear of being prosecuted for mail fraud until
he begins to exert a dominant influence in government decisionmaking. Upon reaching this point, the official is under a fiduciary obligation to both speak truthfully and divulge possible conflicts of
interest.
Like other crimes arising out of deceitful conduct, mail fraud
requires proof of specific criminal intent. 139 Since mail fraud prosecutions only require evidence of a scheme to defraud, not actual fraud,
the intent element takes on greater importance. 140 The term
"scheme to defraud" connotes a certain degree of planning by the
132 Id.
133 Id. at 122. The Margiotta court relied extensively on an article written by Columbia
Law Professor John C. Coffee. See Coffee, supra note 120, at 147.
134 688 F.2d at 122.
135 Id.
136 See Coffee, supra note 120, at 147.
137 Id. See also H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINESS ENTERPRISES §222 (2d ed. 1970).

138 688 F.2d at 122. See also Coffee, supra note 120, at 147-48.
139 United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 1975), cer. denied, 424 U.S. 977
(1976).
140 United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982
(1980)(describing this element as "critical"); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 374 (8th
Cir. 1976)(describing this element as "essential"); United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245,
1247 (8th Cir. 1976) (same).
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defendant. Therefore, the prosecutor must prove intent to defraud.
The prosecutor need not prove, however, that the defendant in4
tended to use the mails to effectuate the scheme.1 '
Specific intent under the mail fraud statute need not be proven
by direct evidence, but may be "inferred" from examining all relevant facts in the development of the schemes. 142 In political corruption cases, courts require proof that schemes employing the mails
were "reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence
and comprehension.' 43 If this test is met, the statutory intent requirement is satisfied. 44
B.

Use of the Mails in Furtheranceof the Scheme

Besides demonstrating a scheme to defraud, prosecutors must
also establish use of the mails. This "mailing element" contains two
separate requirements. First, the defendant must "cause" the use of
the mails, and second, this use must be "for the purpose of execut45
ing" the fraudulent scheme.1
There are two methods for determining when a person "causes"
the mails to be used. A person "causes" the mails to be used when he
possesses actual knowledge that in the ordinary course of business use
of the mails will form a part of the scheme. 146 The defendant need
not specifically intend to use the mails. If, however, the use of the
mail was reasonably foreseeable, this will satisfy the causation ele141 United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 399 (1974).
142 United States v. Alston, 609 F.2d 531, 538 (D.C. Cir.),cert.denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1979);
United States v. Beecroft, 608 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1979).
143 Bush, 522 F.2d at 648 (citing non-political cases as authority: Blachly v. United States,
380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir 1975); United States v. Shavin, 287 F.2d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 944 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 213 F.2d 405, 407 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954)).
144 United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988, 1002-03 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
982 (1980)(Diggs, a Michigan congressman, was prosecuted for inflating his clerk's salaries
and using the increases to pay off personal expenses. The court found that Diggs had placed
the clerks on his payroll so he could use them to funnel funds to himself); United States v.
Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 375 (8th Cir. 1976)(Brown was a St. Louis building commissioner who
convinced a building company to bid on demolition contracts. Once the company received
the bid, Brown would subcontract the project at a lower price and split the proceeds with the
building company. The Eighth Circuit found criminal intent because Brown actively concealed the scheme by instructing the building company to "camouflage" its accounting
records). But see United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1252 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that
the acceptance of a gratuity did not evidence any "widespread municipal corruption or
fraudulent enterprise").
145 United States v. Rabbit, 583 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116
(1979); Brown, 540 F.2d at 375-76.
146 Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1953).
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ment. 4 7 A defendant can, therefore, cause a mailing even if he never
places a letter in a mail box. Applying this law to a political corruption case, a mailing by a clerk, aide, or co-schemer can support mail
fraud charges against an official, if he could have reasonably foreseen
4
that such mailing would occur.'
Mailings are considered to be in furtherance of a scheme even if
they are only incidental to an essential part of the scheme.' 4 9 To
convict a defendant of a mail fraud violation, however, the mailings
must have been "sufficiently closely related" to the fraudulent

scheme. 1r ° Neither mailings made after the scheme's completion' 5 '
nor mailings conflicting with the scheme's purpose 52 satisfy the "in
furtherance of" requirement. Courts have found, however, that
mailings promoting a scheme 53 or mailings concerning the acceptance of the illegal "fruits" of a scheme1 54 do further the unlawful
activity.
Mailings made after the successful completion of the scheme can
support a mail fraud prosecution only if they have been sent as "lulling letters."'155 Mailings which are designed to lull the victim into a
false sense of security or merely to postpone any reports to the authorities about the scheme will meet the "in furtherance" requirement. 56 These "lulling letters" can be essential to the success of the
fraudulent scheme. This is especially true where the fraud is not isolated and where the scheme is to be repeated with different victims or
147 Id. See also Rabbit, 583 F.2d at 1022.
148 See,e.g., United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1979),cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982
(1980) (court found that Diggs could have reasonably foreseen that his clerk would receive
proceeds of a fraudulent check scheme through the mails, since the clerk was stationed in
Diggs' home office in Detroit, Michigan). United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364,376 (8th Cir.
1976) (court found no evidence that Brown had actual knowledge mails were used. Brown,
however, could have reasonably foreseen that non-defendants would use the mails to transfer
the scheme's funds). One commentator has noted that construing "caused" to mean "reasonably foreseeable" dilutes the added requirement of a mailing "in furtherance of the scheme."
In effect, this construction makes the term "synonymous with any mailing, no matter how
tenuously related to the scheme." Morano, supra note 89, at 51-52.
149 Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954). See also United States v. Curry, 681
F.2d 406, 410 (4th Cir. 1982); Diggs, 613 F.2d at 988; Brown, 540 F.2d at 376.
150 United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 399 (1974).
151 Id.
152 United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875 (1974), re'din parton rehearingen bane, 517 F.2d
53 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975).
153 United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1982).
154 United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1152 (7th Cir.),cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
155 United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962).
156 United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 403 (1974).
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continued with the same victim over an extended period of time.157
Summarizing this section, the final element under the mail
fraud statute is the use of the mails in furtherance of a fraudulent
scheme. In order to "cause" the mails to be used, a defendant must
execute the scheme either knowing that the mails will be used or
having reasonably foreseen that the mails would be used. Additionally, although the mailings need not be essential to the scheme's success or failure, they must be "sufficiently closely related" to the
scheme.
III.

Defenses

Since an essential element of mail fraud is specific intent, 158
good faith is a complete defense.1 59 If a defendant believed in good
faith that his alleged misrepresentations were accurate, he cannot be
convicted of mail fraud.1 6° In other words, if the defendant believed
when he made his statement that it was true, it does not make any
difference if the statement was in fact false. Evidence of good faith is
1 61
considered in light of all the facts and circumstances of the case.
To place the good faith defense before the jury, the defendant need
only offer minimal evidence in support, even if purely circumstantial.16 2 Any evidence of good faith, no matter how dubious, weak, or
inconsistent, places this issue before the jury.1 63
IV.

Conclusion

As with the Travel Act, federal prosecutors and courts are now
realizing the potential uses for the mail fraud statute in combating
political corruption. The relative ease of proving mail fraud violations and the apparent increase in corrupt political activities have
caused more political officials to face mail fraud prosecutions. The
recent successful prosecution of a non-elected political official fore157

United States v. Angelli, 660 F.2d 23 (2d Cir- 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 (1982);

United States v. Boyd, 606 F.2d 792, 794 (8th Cir. 1979).
158 See notes 139-44 supra and accompanying text.
159 United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1982); Beck v. United States, 305
F.2d 595, 599 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
160 United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d 406, 416 (4th Cir. 1982).
161 MANUAL ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES, Mail Fraud Offenses, 36 F.R.D. 457, 600-08 (1965).
162 United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d at 416 n.25. The court noted that to require direct
evidence of good faith, i.e., elicited from the defendant while on the stand, would "effectively
eviscerate the accused's right not to testify." Id
163 United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d at 416 (citing United States v. Goss, 650 F.2d 1336,
1341 (5th Cir. 1981), as supporting precedent).
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shadows the continuing evolution of the mail fraud act as one of the
public's protectors against bribery and extortion committed by government personnel.
C.

THE HOBBS ACT: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S ANSWER TO
LOCAL POLITICAL CORRUPTION

I.

Purpose and Legislative History

The Hobbs Act' 64 , as it is commonly known, is the current law
combating local political corruption. The Hobbs Act supplanted the
Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934165 (1934 Act), which was designed primarily to reach extortion and racketeering activities engaged in by
organized crime members. 66 The Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Local 807 Brotherhoodof Teamsters'V6 prompted congressional
action that resulted in the Hobbs Act.
In United States v. Local 807,168 Teamsters labor union members
conspired to use and actually used violence and threats to force owners and drivers of trucks to pay a sum of money for each truck entering the city. In some cases, the union members offered to unload the
trucks, but required a fee payment whether or not they actually performed any services.' 6 9 The Court held these activities beyond the
170
reach of the 1934 Act.

The Hobbs Act was intended to reach activity similar to that in
Local 807 and to fill the gap in the 1934 Act. 71 Congressman Hobbs
said the purpose of his proposed bill was to protect interstate commerce and free the highways of robbers. 72 Most of the debate over
amendment of the 1934 Act centered on the Act's effect on labor and
73
labor activities.
164 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976). See text accompanying note 175 infra.
165 49 Stat. 979 (1934).
166 United States v. Local 807 Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521, 530 (1942).
167 315 U.S. 521 (1942)
168 Id
169 Id at 526.
170 Id at 538-39. The Court interpreted the "exclusion of payment of wages by a bonafide employer to a bona-fide employee" in the 1934 Act to apply to the Local 807 situation.
Whether or not this could be considered a bona-fide employer-employee relationship is indeed questionable.
171 91 CoNG. REc. 11,905 (1945). See also United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 31 n.7'
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); United States v. Beck, 511 F.2d 997, 1000 (6th
Cir.),.cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
172 91 CONG. REO. 11,912 (1945).
173 See id at 11,899-922.
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The evolution of the Hobbs Act would startle the student of legislative history. The statute indeed reaches labor activity, 174 but the
language of the Hobbs Act has also been construed in a different
direction. This analysis of the Act will consider the Hobbs Act's redirection and expansion to cover local political corruption, which is
now the clear, albeit unlikely, focus of the Hobbs Act.
The Hobbs Act, in pertinent part, provides:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce,
by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this
section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than twenty years, or both.
(b) (2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or
threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right. 175
Part (a) requires an affect on interstate commerce, and confers
jurisdiction for federal prosecution of extortion. Part (b)(2) defines
extortion, providing two approaches for prosecution: extortion by
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear; and extortion under color of official right.
Until the early 1970's and the landmark case of United States v.
Kenny 176, "extortion under color of official right" was largely ignored.
The meaning of the phrase "under color of official right," like the
purpose of the Hobbs Act, seemed clear from legislative history.
Mr. Day: . . . but what do the words [color of] official right mean?

police officer, you
Mr. Hobbs: In other words, you pretend to be a1 77
pretend to be a deputy sheriff, but you are not.
Mr. Hobbs' response seems in line with the Act's original purpose to
reach labor activity. In the above example, the Act would reach la178
bor members who pose as public officials to extort money.
The phrase "under color of official right" has been interpreted
broadly, however, and now represents the vehicle for federal prosecu174 See, e.g., United States v. Callanan, 223 F.2d 171 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862
(1955); United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415 (1956).
175 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976).
176 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1972). See text accompanying note 296 infra.
177 89 CoNG. REc. 3229 (1943).
178 The "color" language assists in closing the gap in the 1934 Act created by the Local
807 case, because the union members who interfered with commerce by stopping vehicles
while posing as public officials would come within the purview of the new act.
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tion of public officials. The following sections discuss the requirements for bringing a political corruption prosecution under the
Hobbs Act.
Part II discusses the jurisdictional requirement of effect on interstate commerce, as well as the remaining elements required under
the Hobbs Act, as they pertain to the prosecution of public officials.
Part III addresses attempted extortion and conspiracy. Part IV considers defenses to prosecution, and Part V concludes with a look to
the future of Hobbs Act prosecutions. The expansion of the Hobbs
Act is fascinating, but one wonders whether there are any limits.
II.

Elements of the Offense
A. Jurisdiction

Congressional power to enact the Hobbs Act came from the
commerce clause of the United States Constitution. 79 Under that
authority, Congress has the broad power to regulate interstate commerce.180 The breadth of Congress' control over interstate commerce
partly accounts for the relaxed interpretation of the "effect on commerce" language in section 1951 of the Hobbs Act.
The cases'18 remind us that Congress' commerce clause power is
plenary, and that section 1951 contemplates the full use of that
power.'8 2 The Supreme Court itself recognized that the Hobbs Act
speaks in broad terms, designed to utilize all of Congress' power to
8 3
punish interference with interstate commerce.
The language of the statute itself is of clear import: whoever in
any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce is drawn
within the scope of the Act. 8 4 The nexus between the extortionate
activity and interstate commerce need only be de minimis.'8 5 For example, in one case, 8 6 the extortion victim bought copper wire for his
179

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

180 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253-58 (1964); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-29 (1942). See aso United States v. Gill, 490 F.2d 233, 236 (7th
Cir. 1973).
181 See, e.g., United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 642 (3d Cir.),cerl. denied, 423 U.S. 1014
(1975); United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816, 821-22 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
969 (1974).
182 See, e.g., United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 642 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014
(1975); United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816, 821-22 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
969 (1974).
183 Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960).
184 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1976).
185" United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969
(1974). See also United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 397 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.

819 (1976).
186

United States v. Price, 617 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1979).
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business, which normally travelled through the channels of interstate
commerce; that fact was sufficient for the jurisdictional nexus, even
though the victim's purchases were infrequent.18 7 This type of case
demonstrates situations where there is some real effect on interstate
commerce.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the jurisdictional nexus is met even where the
extortion had no actual effect on commerce.18 8 The court held that
jurisdiction is satisfied by showing a realisticprobability that an extortion will have some effect on interstate commerce.'8 9 In UnitedStates v.
Staszcuk, an alderman accepted $3,000 for not opposing a zoning
change that would permit certain construction. 190 The construction
never took place,' 9 ' but the court found, through testimony by an
estimator for one of the contractors, that had the construction oc92
curred, it would have involved the use of out-of-state supplies.
The courts interpret the "realistic probability" concept loosely,
perhaps stretching the concept beyond what it can logically endure.
The probability of effect on commerce is strained in two areas: in the
depletion of assets cases and in FBI-related cases.
Several circuits have advanced the depletion of assets theory, extending the potential effect theme.' 93 The theory is simple: any extortion that reduces a victim's ability to participate in interstate
commerce satisfies the "effect" requirement.194 For example, if a victim paid $500 to the public official, he (the victim) had $500 less in
187
188

Id at 457.
United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 58 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S.

837 (1975).
189 517 F.2d at 60.
190 Id at 56.
191 Id
192 Id The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that Congress was as much
concerned with the threatened impact of prohibited conduct as with its actual effect. Id Even
possible delay satisfies the jurisdictional nexus required. See United States v. Pranno, 385
F.2d 387, 389 (7th Cir.),cert.denied, 390 U.S. 944 (1967). See also United States v. Phillips, 577
F.2d 495 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978). In United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d
49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972), the court found that obtaining a tribute from
contractors engaged in local construction offaciities to serve interstate commerce was subject
to Hobbs jurisdiction; the purpose of the extortion need not be to affect commerce, but that
one of the natural effects of the extortion be an effect on interstate commerce. 451 F.2d at 77.
See a/so Huluhan v. United States, 214 F.2d 441, 445 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 856

(1954).
193 United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116
(1979); United States v. Phillips, 577 F.2d 495 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978);
United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974).
194 DeMet, 486 F.2d at 822.
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assets which he could have used to purchase interstate goods. The
possibility that the extorted money would have been used to buy interstate goods can be sufficient. 9 5 The theory presumes the victim
engages in interstate commerce at least infrequently.
UnitedStates v. Hyde expanded this concept. The Fifth Circuit in
Hyde held that the victim company need not be engaged in interstate
commerce at the moment of the extortion, 9 6 so long as the company
was formed for thepurpose of engaging in interstate commerce. 97 In
contrast, the Second Circuit 19 stressed that the victim's interstate
purchases must be of a continuing nature, or the nexus between the
commerce and the extortion is rendered merely conjectural. 99
The circuit courts, however, have affirmed convictions in many
instances where it was impossible for the extortion scheme to ever affect interstate commerce. Several cases involve FBI undercover operations. In one attempt prosecution case, 2°° the Seventh Circuit
195 See, e.g., United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043
(1980); United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837
(1975). In Cedilli, the court rejected the contention that the depletion of assets theory should
only be applied where the victim is itself an interstate business, id at 424; the victim need
only minimally participate in iiterstate commerce. Here, the victims purchased fuel and
supplies that travelled in commerce.
196 448 F.2d 815, 836 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058 (1972).
197 Id
198 United States v. Merolla, 523 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1975).
199 In Merolla, the victim's involvement in the construction appeared to be a single venture, and nothing indicated he had worked any other construction jobs. Additionally, all the
materials required for the construction channels, though surely travelling through interstate
commerce, previously had arrived and there was little likelihood the victim would have
purchased additional interstate goods. Thus, depletion of the victim's assets would not have
resulted in an effect on interstate commerce. Id at 55. This case is conservative, if not unique,
in its analysis and result. Compare United States v. Crowley, 504 F.2d 992, 997 (7th Cir.
1974), where the court rejected the notion that interstate commerce cannot be affected once
the goods have come to rest. The Seventh Circuit noted that this result was directed by the
Supreme Court in Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967). Although the Supreme Court's pronouncement came in a Sherman Act case, the Seventh Circuit applied the principle since the
Hobbs Act requires only a de minimis effect while the Sherman Act requires a substantial
effect.
200 United States v. Crowley, 504 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1974). In Crowley, the FBI provided
the last in a series of payments on which the arrest was based. The court did not rely exclusively on the FBI payment to substantiate the depletion of assets theory since the victims had
made five prior payments, but the court did not exclude the FBI payment from its analysis.
See a/so United States v. Glynn, 627 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1980). In United States v. Rindone, 631
F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1980), all of the extorted funds were provided by the FBI. The court
conceded as plausible the defendant's argument that, since the FBI provided the money paid,
no depletion of the victim's assets was possible. Id at 492. But the court circumvented the
argument and found the required "effect." The court characterized the offense as an attempted extortion; the defendant's offense was complete when he demanded, not received,
the payment, even though the money was paid and the extortion completed. The use of FBI
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sustained the depletion of assets theory where the FBI provided the
extortion money; that the FBI provided the payoff money was con20
sidered irrelevant to the jurisdictional inquiry.
In another case, 20 2 the victim was an FBI-created corporation
with no interstate contacts. The defendants argued that, since their
activities could not constitute a completed Hobbs Act violation, they
20 3
could not be convicted of an attempt to violate the Hobbs Act.

20 4
The court rejected this impossibility defense.
A few other cases have sustained the depletion of assets theory
where any interstate commerce effect was factually impossible, in situations where the payment was intended to be recovered immediately, 20 5 and where the victim was a company not yet formed or
established and which never purchased goods interstate. 20 6 These
cases indicate that it is enough that the extortion scheme, if successful
money after completion of the extortion attempt does not reduce the reasonable probability
that, at the time of the attempt, the victim's assets would be potentially depleted. Id at 493.
See also United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1977), where the official was paid to
help the victim cheat on a real estate brokers exam; the victim did not participate in interstate commerce, but the real estate brokers who may take the test did.
201 United States v. Rindone, 631 F.2d 491, 494 (7th Cir. 1980). The court noted that the
well-settled law of the Seventh Circuit is that jurisdiction is met by an implied unrealizable
threat to affect the future business of a victim. Id These cases also raise questions regarding
the "obtaining of property of another" as required by the Hobbs Act. See notes 244-63 hnfja
and accompanying text. Is it important that the property obtained from the victim is not
really his and was provided to him especially for extortion payments? Perhaps it should be,
especially if the Hobbs Act's focus is on the victim's loss. See note 255 inrfa and accompanying
text.
202 United States v. Brooklier, 459 F. Supp. 476 (C.D. Cal. 1978). See also United States v.
Santoni, 585 F.2d 667 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 990 (1979) (where the victim was
an FBI-created company that required interstate materials for a contract it entered into during the extortion scheme); United States v. Gambino, 566 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1977) (where the
FBI-created sanitation company bought out-of-state equipment and dumped garbage across
state lines in New Jersey), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978).
203 United States v. Brooklier, 459 F. Supp. at 479.
204 Id at 482. The court discusses the distinction between legal and factual impossibility.
Three approaches are identified and outlined by the court. Id at 479-82. The Third Circuit
would dismiss the Hobbs charge in Brooklier because the extortion could not have affected
interstate commerce, since the company was merely a shell not engaged in any commerce.
The Second Circuit would not dismiss, since the defendants would have violated the Act but
for the circumstances unknown to them, i.e., that the company was not engaged in interstate
commerce. The Fifth Circuit would also not dismiss, since the activities of the defendants
strongly and unequivocably corroborate an intent to violate the Hobbs Act. The Brooklier
court adopted the Fifth Circuit approach. Id at 483.
205 United States v. Phillips, 577 F.2d 495 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978)
(involving a conspiracy charge under the Hobbs Act).
206 United States v. Bellomini, 454 F. Supp. 44, 47 (W.D. Pa. 1978). The court said that
the only inquiry is whether the attempt was made on an enterprise which intended to engage in
interstate commerce. See also notes 196 & 197 supra and accompanying text.
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or not, would have affected commerce. The defendant's ignorance of
the facts making an effect on commerce impossible - that the FBI
provided the pay or that the company was not engaged in interstate
20 7
commerce - will not relieve him of guilt.
The Hobbs Act appears most concerned with averting adverse
impact on interstate commerce. But the language of the statute is
not specifically limited to adverse impact, although the words "delay.
or obstruct" convey that impression. The language should be construed in its entire context-"whoever in any way. .. affects commerce. 208 A beneficial effect, then, could satisfy the jurisdictional
nexus.
Some cases do reach the conclusion that "affect" means to affect
in any way-adversely or beneficially. The Seventh Circuit has held
that facilitating the flow of building materials across state lines satisfies the jurisdictional nexus. 20 9 The Eighth Circuit specifically examined the government's contention that the Hobbs Act is not
limited to extortion which has an adverse effect. 2t 0 The court
avoided deciding the issue by finding the effect elsewhere, but expressed its difficulty with the theory. The Court's concern centered
on notions of comity, that basing jurisdiction on an adverse or beneficial effect would extend Hobbs jurisdiction to common law crimes
207 See, e.g., United States v. Rindone, 631 F.2d 491, 494 (7th Cir. 1980). The defendant's
lack of knowledge regarding the circumstances of the transaction is somewhat at odds with
the intent requirement discussed in the text accompanying notes 218-22 infra. As pointed out
there, no specific intent to affect interstate commerce is required, but a general intent is required, usually proved by the inference that one is presumed to intend the consequences that
reasonably flow from his actions. Can it realistically be asserted that an effect on interstate
commerce reasonably flows from actions that could never affect interstate commerce? Is an
effect reasonably probable when it is impossible? The government tries to avoid answering
such questions by characterizing the crime as an attempt. Two problems arise: first, in most
of the cases, the extortion money is actually paid and the crime completed; second, attempt is
a specific intent crime.
208 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1976).
209 United States v. Kuta, 518 F.2d 947, 951 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975);
United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 56 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975).
The Seventh Circuit held in both cases that facilitating interstate commerce satisfied the
jurisdictional requirement, but neither defendant specifically argued the beneficial-adverse
distinction. In Sozcuk, the alderman took $3,000 and later implicitly supported a proposal
for a zoning change favorable to the victim, yet the victim never built what the change would
have allowed. The court found that, had the victim built, the construction would have required interstate goods, i.e., would have increased the flow of commerce. In Kula, also involving zoning, the public official accepted money to not object to a proposed change, which
change later passed. The constructions could not have been built under the prior zoning
laws, and those buildings used materials from interstate commerce.
210 United States v. French, 628 F.2d 1069, 1076-77 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 956
(1980).
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traditionally covered by state law.2 1' The court put aside the broad-

ness of the Hobbs language and focused instead on legislative history;
this history indicates no intent to punish activity not adversely affecting commerce.

21 2

The Eighth Circuit's discussion expresses concern with the expansive tendency in Hobbs Act prosecutions.2 1 3 Yet limiting jurisdiction to only those cases where interstate commerce is adversely
affected seems ill-advised, since some extortionate activity could escape prosecution. Moreover, .use of the word "affects" would be redundant if the word meant "adversely affects" since "delay" and
"obstruct" sufficiently convey that meaning.
Jurisdiction is the easiest of the Hobbs Act elements to demonstrate. Any actual, probable, or potential delay, obstruction, or effect
will do. But this showing must not be overlooked. In UnitedStates v.
Elders,2 14 the government failed to meet its burden of proving some
interstate effect on commerce. The government argued that the extortion payments paid by a construction company artificially inflated
the charges to the city. The city treasury, therefore, had fewer dollars available for municipal projects requiring use of interstate goods
or services provided by interstate contractors.2 1 5 The court, in finding
that this theory lacked logic, 21 6 essentially curtailed the expansion of

the de minimis effect theory. Though de minimis, the effect must be
more than a "speculative, attenuated 'one step removed' kind of
'217
effect. '
211 628 F.2d at 1077.
212 Id
213 Although the Eighth Circuit refused to expand the jurisdictional basis of the Hobbs
Act by including beneficial effects, the court did advance an expansive concept of its own.
The court opined that even if the extorter did not affect the quantity of interstate commerce,
he surely affected the quality of commerce. Id at 1078. The defendant became involved with
a company in interstate commerce, and created an incentive to corrupt practices. That is, the
defendant infused corrupt practices into a company whose activities crossed state lines.
Query: would activity that "benefitted" the "quality" of interstate commerce be sufficient?
It seems that it would.
214 569 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1978).
215 Id
216 Id at 1025.
217 Id The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Mattson, 671 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1982),
confronted a 'one step removed' type of effect and denied jurisdiction. The court held that
the extortion of $3,000 from an individual so he could obtain an electrician's license could not
be said to affect interstate commerce because the victim's employer (Playboy) had interstate
ties. 671 F.2d at 1025. "The Hobbs Act requires interstate commerce to be affected by extorlion, not by a result of extortion." Id One district court has, however, taken an additional
step. In United States v. Bryson, 418 F. Supp. 818 (W.D. Okla. 1975), the court seized on the
last clause of § 1951(b)(3), which includes all other commerce over which the United States
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B. Intent
The government need not demonstrate any specific intent of the
public official. 218 The public official does not have to intend to affect
interstate commerce; it is immaterial whether or not the defendants
intended or even contemplated an effect on interstate commerce. 21 9
All that must be shown is that the public official extorted or attempted to extort, and that those acts affected or would affect interstate commerce. 220 This proof of general intent is simple, since one is
held to have intended the consequences that reasonably flow from his
actions. 22 1 In the indictment, the government need only allege the
22 2
effect on interstate commerce in conclusory terms.
C. Extortion
The Hobbs Act prohibits interference with interstate commerce
by robbery or extortion. 223 Robbery is defined in section 1951(b)(1).
A public official could violate section 1951(b)(1) just as any other
individual. Since the crime does not depend in any way on the perpetrator's status as a public official, a discussion of robbery is beyond
the scope of this note.
Extortion, however, provides two alternate theories of prosecution: extortion by use of force, fear, or violence, or extortion under
225
color of official right. 224 The public official could violate either.
Although the relationship to official position is clearer under color of
has jurisdiction. In Bgyson, the court noted that the National Bank Act (an act of Congress)
regulates commerce; thus, the operations or commerce of a bank chartered under the act
would be within Hobbs Act commerce. 418 F. Supp. at 824. The district court observed that
the statute uses "commerce" and not "interstate commerce," although the latter is specifically
included in the former. Id
218 United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 424 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043
(1980); United States v. Spagnolo, 546 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
909 (1977); United States v. Gupton, 495 F.2d 550, 551 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Pranno, 385 F.2d 387, 389 (7th Cir. 1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 944 (1968). In Cerilli, the
court did not specifically state that specific intent is required, but inferred such by stating that
the purpose of the extortion need not be to affect interstate commerce.
219 United States v. Spagnolo, 546 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir. 1976), cent. denied, 433 U.S.
882 (1977).
220 See note 192 supra.
221 United States v. Mitchell, 463 F.2d 187, 192 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 969
(1973); United States v. Green, 246 F.2d 155, 159-60 (7th Cir.), cerl. denied, 355 U.S. 871
(1957). See note 207 supra and accompanying text.
222 United States v. Williams, 679 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1982).
223 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1976).
224 18 U.S.C. §1951(b)(2) (1976).
225 United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1229 (3d Cir.),cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972).
See, e.g., United States v. Lynn, 608 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1979) (assistant police chief extorted
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official right, extortion both through force or fear and under color of
official right relate somewhat to official position. The office puts the
individual in a position to successfully extort money or property from
another.
1. Definition of Public Official
For purposes of extortion by fear, the Hobbs Act does not require status as a public official. Extortion under color of official
right, however, presupposes some public trust position.
The original intent of Congress regarding who is "under color of
official right" is confusing. Congressman Hobbs, the bill's sponsor,
defined "under color of official right" as pretending to be a public
official. 226 Congressman Simmons, in trying to explain the term to a
colleague, said the language means money obtained by someone
claiming to be a public officer.2 27 Members of Congress expressed
concern over possible misinterpretation, but passed no amendment
228
to clarify the language.
Discussion in the cases is clear. 229 The language has been inter-

preted to mean extortion by a public official.2 30 Yet the parameters
defining when one becomes a public official, and for how long one
remains a public official, are fuzzy. In one case, 23 1 the Second Circuit held that the chairman of a state Republican Party violated the
Hobbs Act.2 32 Although he was not an officer of the federal or state
government, he had control, in his position as chairman, over area
money through threats of physical violence); United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639 (3d Cir.),

cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975) (state senator extorted money under color of official right).
226 89 CONG. REC. 3229 (1943). These remarks are from the discussions the first time the
Hobbs bill was introduced; the bill as later passed was substantially unchanged from the
original version.
227 Id See note 177 supra and accompanying text.
228 Id
229 Although the court cases clearly interpret the Hobbs Act to include extortion by a
public official, the legislative history on this point is not so clear. This result is, however,
partially supported in the legislative history. The Hobbs Act, according to Hobbs, was
drafted using New York state law as a model. 91 CONG. REc. 11,843 (1945). Under New
York law, extortion tracked the common law definition, meaning wrongfully obtaining
money by a public official. Id See United States v. French, 628 F.2d 1069, 1073 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980). Such a construction, however, seems contrary to the founding purpose of the Hobbs Act, which was to curb illicit labor activity. 91 CONG. REC. 11,843
(1945).

230 See, e.g., United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914
(1972).
231 United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982).
232 Id at 131.
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public officials. 233 On the basis of 18 U.S.C. §2(b), the court con234
cluded the defendant chairman was punishable as a principal.
235
Candidates for public office can also violate the Hobbs Act.
United States v. Mqers involved not a substantive violation of the
Hobbs Act, but a conspiracy: the court drew a distinction and suggested that perhaps the candidate for public office could not substan236
tively violate Hobbs, but could conspire to do so.
At the other end of the spectrum, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals said that Hobbs extortion is a continuing offense. 237 No statute of limitations problem arises where the official arranges for continuous payments over a period of time. 238 Even though the official
receives the last payments months after his term expires, the violation
continues up to and including that latter date. 239 This extension

seems quite logical, since the original violation under color of official
right is what prompts the final payment, even though the official no
24
longer has any "official" power. 0

Although the concept of "public official" is somewhat limited,
anyone can be a victim of a Hobbs extortion. The victim need not
be completely innocent or worthy of protection. In one case, the Sev-

enth Circuit convicted a public official for extorting money from an
illegal business. 24 t The FBI is the "victim" in its undercover operations.242 Moreover, the subject of the extortion need not constitute
233 Id
234 Id 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1976) reads: "[Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which
if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is
punishable as a principal."
235 United States v. Meyers, 529 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976).
The defendants in Aeyer. were candidates as a result of a primary election held earlier.
236 Id at 1035-36. The court stressed that "under color of official right" modifies "obtaining of property from another" and not conspiracy; therefore, the defendants were charged
and convicted of conspiracy to obtain property under color of official right and not with
conspiracy under color of official right. The court seems to suggest the latter would not include candidates for office, but clearly indicates that the former does include the candidates.
The court rejected an impossibility defense, id at 1037, intimating that had the candidates
not ultimately been installed in office, the conviction could still stand. Conviction of a candidate who is never elected is doubtful, however, for two reasons. First, the court stressed that
the conspiracy was a continuing offense and did not end until after they took office. Second,
these particular defendants were in a viable position to actually obtain the office, as winners
in the primary election.
237 United States v. Forszt, 655 F.2d 101, 104 (7th Cir. 1981).
238 Id
239 Id
240 See notes 270 & 271 in/ra and accompanying text.
241 United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 783 (7th Cir. 1979).
242 See the cases in notes 200-03 inra and accompanying text.
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interstate commerce3 43 This construction is logical, since the focus
of the Hobbs Act, as in any criminal statute, is on the perpetrator of
the crime and not on its prey. The real victim of a Hobbs violation is
the general public, which has conferred upon the official a position of
trust and authority. The official's abuse of his office injures the entire
community and the reputation of government; the Hobbs Act makes
the particular victim hardly seem relevant.
2.

Property

Section 1951(b) (2) refers to obtaining property from another.
The first indication of the property's scope is the variance in termi2 44
nology from section 1951(b)(1) which refers to personal property,
to section 1951 (b) (2), where no such limitation exists. The concept of
"property" under the Hobbs Act is broad enough to encompass both
tangible and intangible interests. The courts reject a narrow inter'245
pretation of "property.
These tangible and intangible interests are related, creating a
two-tiered deprivation in a Hobbs Act extortion. The first tier is the
actual payment made by the victim, a tangible interest. The second
and underlying tier involves the threatened deprivation or action by
the official, an intangible interest. When the latter interest is conditioned on the former, extortion exists.
First-tier tangible rights are easier to spot. The victim makes
some sort of payment to the official-money, property, services, or
personalty. The common law definition of extortion is helpful: under
the common law, extortion is the obtaining, by a public official,
money not due his office, or not yet due his office. 246 That is, the
243 United States v. Nakaladski, 481 F.2d 289, 298 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064
(1973). Following the requirement that there be only a reasonable probability that interstate
commerce be affected, the victim himself need not be in interstate commerce at all. In
Nakaladski, the defendant extorted money from an individual, and not from his store, which
engaged in commerce. The court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the
payments made by the victim would affect his payments to suppliers of interstate goods. Id
at 299. See also United States v. Spagnolo, 546 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
909 (1977), where the target of the extortion was the financial source of a construction company which purchased interstate materials. The required interstate effect was met, since
withdrawal of the financial source was reasonably likely to hinder the construction firm's
ability to purchase interstate goods.
244 Section 1951(b)(1) reads in pertinent part: "[T]he term robbery means the unlawful
taking or obtaining of personal property from the person. ....
"
245 See, e.g., United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828
(1976).
246 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 146. See a/so United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d
639, 650 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975).
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official has not the authority or right to request, demand, or accept
any payment. His office has no right to the victim's property.
The interpretation of "wrongful" in section 1951(b) (2) is also
enlightening. "Wrongful" indicates that the extortionist must have
had no lawful rights in the property concerned. 247 One court explained that section 1951 does not apply to wrongful use of force to
achieve a legitimate goal; "wrongful" could not modify the force or
threats since they are wrongful in themselves. 248 In one case, 249 the
extortionist defendants had contract rights under a management
agreement which entitled them to money. They demanded a
$50,000 payment and threatened eviction of the victims. Although
the defendants had rights in the property, the court sustained the
convictions since the defendants did not act in reliance on those
rights. 250 The extortionist, then, must have no lawful right to the
property concerned.
The second-tier intangible rights or interests are tougher to spot
because of their abstract nature. The proper starting focus of any
extortion inquiry is whether or not the victim's interest was sufficient. 25' Yet, the concept of property under the Hobbs Act includes
"any valuable right considered as a source of wealth. '252 It appears,
then, that the interest must at least have economic value, and the
cases support this notion. Examples of sufficient property interests
include the right to be free of police harassment in operating a business; 25 3 the right to avoid economic loss;254 the right to bid for state
contracts without paying a fee;25 5 the right to lease space in a bow-

ling alley free from threats; 256 the right to solicit accounts; 257 and the
right to solicit business free from threatened destruction and physical
247 United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 400 (1973); United States v. Arambasich, 597
F.2d 609, 611 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250, 1257 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1975).
248 United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 400 (1973).
249 United States v. Porcano, 648 F.2d 753 (Ist Cir. 1981).
250 Id at 760.
251 United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 395 n.6 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828
(1976).
252 United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1075 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1021 (1970).
253 United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 151 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910
(1975).
254 United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816, 819 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1973).
255 United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975).
256 United States v. Battaglia, 383 F.2d 303 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 907 (1967).
257 United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021
(1970).
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harm. 258 Inhibiting another from doing business, then, is a taking of
2 59

property.
United States v. Hyde26 ° provides an interesting example of the
two levels of deprivation. In Hyde, public officials coerced companies
into paying fees to avoid legal action by the state attorney general's
office. 26 1 The companies were first deprived of the money paid in
"fees". Second, the court said the officials deprived the victims of
their right to an impartial determination of the propriety of legal
action.

26 2

Extortion depends on the victim's consent. 263 The victim must
give the property to the extorter, in contrast to section 1951(b)(1)
robbery, where the property is taken by force. The distinction seems
illusory, however, when considering the "voluntariness" of the victim's extorted payment. Of course the victim consents to paying the
official, but what are his alternatives?
3.

The Transaction

Although the defendant must extort property, the extortion
scheme need not benefit the extortionist.2 64 A Hobbs Act inquiry
focuses not on the extortionist's gain, but rather on the victim's
loss. 265 The Supreme Court stated that extortion in no way depends
on the extortionist's direct benefit.2 66 The lower courts have followed
the Supreme Court's assertion by requiring that no benefit, indirect
or direct, be proved. 267 One court held that the government need
only prove the payments were made at the extortionist's direction to
258 United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1174 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916
(1981).
259 The intangible rights may be present rights or rights pertaining to future expectations.
In United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976), the
defendants argued that since the victim had no existing property right in the contract on
which he bid, he could not fear or suffer economic loss if he did not get the contract. The
court rejected such a narrow interpretation of property and economic rights, stating that
some property rights existed or the victim would have no incentive to succumb to the defendant's demands. See notes 288-92 infra and accompanying text.
260 448 F.2d 815 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058 (1971).
261 Id at 820. See notes 302-05 infra and accompanying text.
262 448 F.2d at 833.
263 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1976).
264 United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 843 (5th Cir.), cerl. denied, 404 U.S. 1058 (1971);
United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, 686 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947 (1964).
265 Provenzano, 334 F.2d at 686; Hyde, 448 F.2d at 843.
266 United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 420 (1956).
267 United States v. Clemente, 640 F.2d 1069, 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 820
(1981); United States v. Trotta, 525 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1975);
United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 843 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058 (1972).

[Vol. 58:1027]

a person named by him. 26

NOTE

Some courts hold that neither the extor-

tionists nor anyone else need ever be paid or benefit from the unlawful activity. 269 The act of inducing the payment, rather than
receiving it, is the crime.
Just as the extortionist need not receive any benefit, he need not
provide anything either. The government is not required to prove
that the defendant actually possessed the power to carry out his
threats or to'provide what he promised. 2 70 The only inquiry in this
regard is whether or not the victim reasonably believed the official
271
had power, regardless of the official's actual power.
4.

Fear

For extortion by force, violence, or fear, the victim's state of
mind is a critical element, 27 2 because the government must prove reasonable fear in the victim. Proof of fear requires a showing of three
factors: (1) the victim feared; (2) the fear was reasonable; and (3) the
defendant exploited the fear.273 The victim's testimony regarding

what others said to him and other's statements regarding what they
said to the victim are admissible. 27 4 Because this evidence establishes
the state of mind of the victim, it falls within that exception to the
hearsay rule.27 5 The evidence, however, may not be used to prove
2 77
the extortion itself;276 it is restricted to proof of state of mind.

Whether the defendant must create the fear or merely exploit it
is uncertain. At a minimum, guilt is established if the defendant cre268 United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, 686 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947
(1964). In Provenzano, the extorted payment was made to the defendant's friend instead of the
defendant. 334 F.2d at 68-86. In Trotta, the wrongful payments were made to a political
party. 525 F.2d at 1097-98.
269 United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531, 546 (5th Cir.),cert.denied, 103 S. Ct. 256 (1982).
270 United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 643 (3d Cir.) (state senator had no statutory, de
jure power to control the granting of state leases, but 'his exploiting of victim's reasonable
belief that he had such power is sufficient for extortion), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975);
United States v. Salvitti, 464 F. Supp. 611, 616"(E.D. Pa. 1979) (government need not prove
that defendant actually had the power to carry out his threats).
271 See id.
272 United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816, 819-20 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969
(1973); United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 59 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972);
United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 845 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058 (1971).
273 486 F.2d at 820; 448 F.2d at 845.
274 448 F.2d at 845. See FED. R. EvID. 803(3).
275 448 F.2d at 845.
276 FED. R. EvID. 803(3).
277 Id
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ates and exploits fear in the victim. 278 Some courts hold, however,
2 79
that defendants need only exploit an existing fear of the victim.
Under this interpretation, a defendant can be convicted of extortion
by force or by exploiting a victim's fears, regardless of the source
280
creating the fear and despite the absence of threats.
The victim's fear can encompass fear of loss of money, economic
advantage, property-anything within the definitions of property
discussed above. 281 Fear of economic loss is the broadest category,
especially since proof of verbal or physical threat is unnecessary for a
28 2
conviction.
United States v. DeMer 28 3 illustrates the scope of the fear requirement. In that case, the victim admitted his contacts with the extortionists were friendly, and the defendant never indicated he would
cause trouble. 28 4 The court said that fear need not be a consequence
of a direct threat; rather, it is a consequence of the total circumstances surrounding the extortion. 285 Subtle extortions are covered in
the Hobbs Act, and all the government must show is that the circumstances surrounding the alleged extortion rendered the victim's fear
28 6
reasonable.
Fear is reasonable in a wide range of cases, and dependent on
278

Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862

(1955).
279 United States v. Duhon, 565 F.2d 345, 351 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978).
Clearly, for attempted extortion, an attempt to instill fear in the victim is sufficient. See
United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1167 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
In Duhon, the court stated that the defendant need not have originally caused the fear, nor
need the cause of the fear itself be wrongful. 565 F.2d at 351.
280 Duhon, 565 F.2d at 350 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978) (no explicit requests
for money, but, under the circumstances, the ambiguous statements made by the defendant
could be understood as requests for money); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 372-73
(8th Cir. 1976) (the victims provided services for defendant due to a self-imposed fear of
refusal); United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816, 820 (7th Cir.) (a bar owner paid policeman
not to enforce closing hours, but no direct threats were required and no direct requests for
payment were made by the officer), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1973).
281 See notes 244-54 supra and accompanying text.
282 See note 285 infra. Fear of physical threats or violence are less likely in cases involving
public officials-their tactics are probably more discreet.
283

486 F.2d 816 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1973).

284 486 F.2d at 819. See also United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 834 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1058 (1972) (that the extorters and the victims had cordial relations f consistent with extortion; from the circumstances, the victims could have known of the general
pattern of extortion and sought out the defendant with the knowledge they would have to
eventually deal with him anyway).
285
286

486 F.2d at 820.
United States v. Sander, 615 F.2d 215, 218 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 835 (1980).
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the totality of circumstances. 28 7 Especially interesting and indicative
of the broadness of Hobbs are the cases where the victim fears loss of
property not presently owned. 288 For example, in the fear of economic injury cases, fear of loss of expected monies has been held sufficient. 28 9 In United States v. Addon'io290, the victims paid extorted
money to acquire future contract rights, rather than to protect presently owned contract rights. 29 1 The Third Circuit did not require
the government to prove the payments were made because of
292
threatened interference with then-existing contract rights.
The distinguishing feature of Hobbs extortion under-color-of-official-right section is that a showing of extortion under color of official right does not additionally require a showing of fear.29 3 This was
not always the case. In UnitedStates v. Kubacki, 294 the court held that,
since the public official did not coerce the victim into paying, no
295
extortion resulted, because coercion is an element of the offense.
This may partially explain why color of official right was largely ignored by prosecutors until 1972: if the government must prove fear,
the prior section was equally appropriate for prosecution.
Then, in 1972, in United States v. Kenny,2 96 the Third Circuit
characterized section 195 1(b) (2) differently. First, the "under color
of official right" language was read separately from the "fear" language because of the disjunctive connector "or". 29 7 Second, the
"color" language, once separate, was embodied with the common
law definition of extortion; under common law, extortion required no
proof of threat or fear, and could only be committed by a public
official. 298 Presently, then, no proof of coercion is required in a prose299
cution for extortion under color of official right.
287 See note 285 supra.
288 See note 259 supra and accompanying text.
289 See, e.g., United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 395 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
828 (1976); United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 73 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936
(1972).
290 451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972).
291 451 F.2d at 73.
292 Id
293 United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1229 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972).
294 237 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
295 Id at 641-42.
296 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972).
297 462 F.2d at 1229. See also United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 393 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976).
298 462 F.2d at 1229; 534 F.2d at 393.
299 Id Circuit Judge Tate, concurring in United States v. Williams, 621 F.2d 123, 126-27
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981), vehemently objected to this conclusion. He
felt that the clear congressional intent was to punish, by up to twenty years of imprisonment,
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In some courts, the "office" itself is said to provide the coercive
element. 30° These courts posit that the coercive element on the part
of the official and the duress or fear element on the part of the victim
are implied from the public official's position of authority over the
30o
victim.
The use of public office to induce payments is the focus of the
"color" language. 30 2 The official may induce payments to perform
his duties, not to perform his duties, 30 3 to perform acts unrelated to
his duties, or not to perform acts unrelated to his duties. 30 4 As long
as the victim's payment focuses on the recipient's office, section 1951
is violated. 30 5 The government need not prove that the official had
only extortion by coercion. Whether the "color" language was intended to repeat the common law definition of extortion is unclear. Legislative history offers little indication. Congressman Hobbs stated that the "color" language referred to one pretending to be a public
officer, thus suggesting that the language did not parallel the common law definiton. See
notes 223 & 224 infra and accompanying text. Elsewhere in the legislative debates, however,
Hobbs and others indicate that the language was drawn substantially from the New York
State law, which follows the common law definition of extortion (by a public official and not
requiring proof of duress). See note 226 infia. The Hobbs Act is a federal statute, and looking
to state law to define federal standards is not entirely appropriate. This is especially true
when the bill drafter has specifically defined the terms and the statute's purpose indicates the
correctness of that interpretation. See United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1968),
where the Supreme Court, analyzing a similar situation regarding the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1952, said that even though extortion is defined with reference to state law, Congress does
not necessarily incorporate all state interpretations.
300 United States v. Burkhart, 682 F.2d 589 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 228 (1982);
United States v. Butler, 618 F.2d 411 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 927 (1980); United States
v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1977).
301 Burkhart, 682 F.2d at 592; Butler, 618 F.2d at 418; Harding, 563 F.2d at 304. This
interpretation logically justifies a dispensation of the fear requirement. The focus of "color"
extortion is on the public ofce; the reason the victim pays the official is because he holds that
office and maintains some control, at least apparent, over the victim's present or future
situation.
302 United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 151 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910
(1975).
303 See United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531, 540 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 256
(1982); United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 832 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058 (1971).
304 Braatsch, 505 F.2d at 151.
305 Id United States v. Sutter, 160 F.2d 754 (7th Cir. 1947), exemplifies a court not focusing on the recipient's office. In this case, a federal employee obtained money, claiming that
he would distribute it to various charities. The court reversed the conviction, noting that the
evidence failed to show that the defendant used his employment to extort, but showed he
merely used appealing devices to defraud. United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d at 537, discusses
a related situation. Where a public official is authorized to solicit funds, a fine line separates a
request for support and a sale of a favor. All politicians, according to the court, are aware of
the underlying hope in any donation; therefore, the laws are not designed to punish every
official who solicits money which represents the donor's "expectations." Rather, the quest
centers on those officials who demand money for future "services" under the guise of
donations.
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the power to do or to prevent what he claims he can do or prevent, as
long as the victim reasonably believed that the official had such
3 06
power.
The public official need not initiate the transaction;30 7 the old
distinction between bribery and extortion has faded. Most cases hold
that the two crimes are not mutually exclusive.3 08 That the proscribed
conduct may constitute the crime of bribery is irrelevant,3 0 9 and the
language of the statute does not preclude this conclusion. Section
1951 refers only to obtaining property of another and not to a "demand", and it seems that bribery falls within this language. The
courts insist, though, that mere voluntary payment of money would
not be extortion under the Hobbs Act.3 10 The difficulty stems from
the fine line between a completely voluntary payment and one made
because of the official's position of authority. It seems, then, that if
the public official knows that the motivation of the victim rests on the
office, this is enough to bring the conduct within Hobbs Act extortion.31n In the indictment, the government need only allege extortion
312
in conclusory terms.
III.

Attempted Extortion and Conspiracy
A.

Attempted Extortion

An attempt to extort is clearly within the Hobbs Act, and is
punishable as severely as any completed extortion. In UnitedStates v.
Rosa,313 the Third Circuit held that section 1951 forbids attempted
extortion that would have, if completed, affected commerce. 31 4 In
Rosa, a public official asked a prospective contractor for a "donation" to ensure him the award of a project, and the contractor re306
United States v. Meyers, 529 F.2d 1033, 1038 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894
(1976); United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 643 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975);
United States v. Price, 507 F.2d 1349, 1350 (4th Cir. 1974); Braasch, 505 F.2d at 151; United
States v. Salvitti, 464 F. Supp. 611, 616 (E.D. Pa. 1979); See note 271 supra and accompanying text.
307 United States v. Nelson, 486 F. Supp. 464, 487 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
308 United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.),cer. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976); United
States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); United States v.
Braasch, 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
309 See Braasch, 505 F.2d at 151. See also note 308 supra.
310 See, e.g., United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1195 n.4 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 965 (1981).
311 See, e.g., United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d 778, 783 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 70
(1982); 630 F.2d at 1194 n.4.
312 United States v. Trotta, 525 F.2d 1096, 1099 (2d Cir. 1975).
313 560 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1977).
314 Id at 153.
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fused payment.3 15 Since the construction would have involved
interstate commerce (through use of supplies), the attempted extor31 6
tion, if successful, would have obstructed commerce.
The Rosa court discussed the language of section 1951 referring
to attempts. 3 1 7 The pertinent part reads: "[w]hoever in any way or
degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce . . . by . . . extortion,
or attempts . . . so to do . . ." is guilty of the offense. The official
argued that "attempts" modifies "obstruction of commerce" and not
"extortion;" that is, section 1951 forbids an attempt to interfere with
commerce by a completed extortion. 3 18 The court rejected the argument based on legislative history and precedent. 31 9 Since one violating the Hobbs Act need not intend to interfere with commerce,3 20 and
an attempt requires intent, an attempt to interfere with commerce is
impossible. Attempted extortion, then, occurs when an official attempts to induce a person involved in interstate commerce to give up
32
his property. '
B.

Conspiray

Conspiracy is a separate and distinct offense under the Hobbs
Act. 322 Thus, a defendant can be charged with both a substantive
violation and with conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act. In a conspiracy prosecution, it is irrelevant whether or not the substantive offense
is completed. 32 3 Conspiracy is an agreement between two or more
315 Id at 152.
316 See note 189 supra and accompanying text.
317 560 F.2d at 152.
318 Id
319 Id at 152-53. In a footnote, the court also rejected the defendant's contention that if
§ 1951 is construed to mean "attempted" extortion, the section is void for vagueness. Id. at
154 n.5.
320 See notes 218-21 supra and accompanying text.
321 United States v. Rindone, 631 F.2d 491, 493 (7th Cir. 1980).
322 United States v. Callanan, 364 U.S. 587, 597 (1961); United States v. Shelton, 573
F.2d 917, 919 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 827 (1978); United States v. Jacobs, 451 F.2d
530, 535 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1971). Again, the disjunctive language of
§ 1951(a) suggests that extortion and conspiracy are separate offenses, punishable consecutively. In Callanan, the Supreme Court discussed the sentences of a defendant convicted of
both a substantive and a conspiracy violation of the Hobbs Act. Finding that the two were
distinct crimes, the Court upheld the consecutive separate sentences, which together exceeded
20 years. In dissent, Justice Stewart expressed much concern that one defendant could receive a 100-year prison sentence for committing one criminal transaction. Justice Stewart
suggested that the Hobbs Act be construed to impose only one penalty for each interference
with commerce, not for each means used to restrain commerce. 364 U.S. at 601. Se note 336
in/fa and accompanying text.
323 See Callanan, 364 U.S. 587 (1961). The irrelevence of the substantive offense's completion makes sense, since extortion and conspiracy are separate and distinct offenses.
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persons to commit extortion. 324 Conspiracy is a continuing offense
that can continue until the goal of the scheme is achieved, 325 and the
fact that the conspiracy is unsuccessful will not vitiate a Hobbs Act
violation. 326 Participation in a conspiracy need not be proved by dimay be inferred from a
rect evidence; a common purpose or plan 327
development or collection of circumstances.
The requirement of effect on interstate commerce is nearly extinguished for a conspiracy charge. The Third Circuit has stated
that, where the defendants agree to do acts which, had they been
attainable, would have affected commerce, regardless of whether or
not an actual affect on commerce was reasonably probable, a sufficient federal interest is implicated. 328 That the conspiracy failed is of
no moment; moreover, that the ends of the conspiracy were from the
3 29
beginning objectively unattainable is irrelevant.
IV.

Defenses

The defenses available to a Hobbs Act defendant are few and,
for the most part, very weak. Jurisdiction is nearly impossible to
challenge since such a low threshold of proof is required of the government. 33 0 Even attempted extortion meets the jurisdictional requirements. Since the bribery/extortion distinction has eroded,324 Callanan, 364 U.S. at 597; United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1192 (7th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981);Jacobs, 451 F.2d at 539.
325 Shelton, 573 F.2d at 919;Jaobs, 451 F.2d at 539; United States v. Meyers, 529 F.2d
1033, 1036 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976).
326 United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 591 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2906
(1982); Shelton, 573 F.2d at 919;Jacobs, 451 F.2d at 535. The irrelevance of the conspiracy's
success rests on the potential effect theory; that is, if the conspiracy would have been successful, commerce would have been affected. Interestingly, the person with whom the official
directly interacts need not himself be involved in interstate commerce, so long as one of those
involved in the conspiracy engages in commerce. United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 35
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1258 (1982). When a group acts as a unit in a scheme,
the acts of one not dealing in commerce are "kippered" with those who deal in commerce. Id
at 35.
327 United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 422 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1979).
328 Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 592.
329 Id The district court in Jannotti held that Hobbs Act jurisdiction is not achieved
through a defendant's erroneous perception that his action could affect commerce or by hypothetical potential impacts on commerce which are impossible. United States v. Jannotti, 501
F. Supp. 1182, 1185 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The Third Circuit reversed. 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, S. Ct. 2906 (1982).
330 See notes 189-217 supra and accompanying text. One narrow avenue is available in
some circuits, however. Since it is not clear that a beneficial impact on commerce will .confer
federal jurisdiction, a defendant could allege that the affect was not adverse. See notes 208-12
supra and accompanying text.
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bribery is no longer a valid defense to extortion. 3 3 1 Only a clear
showing that the payment was completely voluntary-a burden, at
best, difficult to meet-will suffice. 3 32 For extortion by force or fear, a
defendant could argue that either no fear existed in the mind of the
victim or that the fear was unreasonable under the particular circumstances; 33 again, the problems of proof will hinder the defendant. For extortion under color of official right, the office itself will
generally provide the coercive element, and defenses that the money
was passively received and unmotivated by the office are weak at
best. 334 Impossibility of success-both to affect interstate commerce
and to extort-has also been rejected as a defense. 3 35 Double jeopardy is precluded as a defense when both conspiracy and extortion
are charged. 336 Even arguments that the Hobbs Act is unconstitutional have failed, as the statute has been upheld under the ninth
33 7
and tenth amendments.
V.

Conclusion: Notions of Comity

Since the expansion of the Hobbs Act, the statute has been used
extensively for prosecution of local political and government officials.3 38 This has traditionally been the function of the individual
states. The Hobbs Act allows the federal government to enter this
state domain without consent by state or local officials.
The importance of attacking local corruption and assisting the
331 See notes 307-08 supra and accompanying text.
332 See note 310 supra and accompanying text.
333 See notes 274-92 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, in those courts requiring the
defendant to both create and exploit the fear, a defense that the extorter did not create the
fear is possible. Of course, the defendant can always argue that the fear was not reasonable.
334 See notes 300-02 supra and accompanying text.
335 See notes 200-07 supra and accompanying text. It is also no defense that the defendant's acts did not constitute racketeering; this need not be alleged or proved by the government. United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 372 (1978).
336 See note 322 supra.
337 See, e.g., United States v. Howe, 353 F. Supp. 419, 424 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (Hobbs Act
does not violate the 9th or 10th amendments); Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 733 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1963). In United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 124 (3d Cir.
1975), the court held that no exemption exists in the Hobbs Act which permits extortion for
religious purposes. In addition, overlapping coverage under other criminal statutes will not
diminish the scope of the Hobbs Act. United States v. Labina, 614 F.2d 1207, 1209 (9th Cir.
1980).
338 It is interesting to note that in United States v. Gillock, the Supreme Court held that
there exists no privilege in federal criminal prosecutions barring introduction into evidence of
legislative acts of a state legislator; only federal privilege law applies in federal criminal cases
(Hobbs) and a state's evidentiary privilege will not apply. 445 U.S. 360, 368 (1980). Where
federal interests are at stake, principles of comity yield. Id. at 373.
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states in quashing government fraud, waste, and abuse cannot be denied. Since the states have voiced no outcry in opposition to the federal government's helping hand, one could assume that they welcome
33 9
the statute and need its protection.
D.
I.

BRIBERY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS

Legislative Intent of Federal Bribery Statute

The federal

bribery statute 34 0 proscribes certain conduct

339 The political climate in a local community may well explain why a state would welcomefeikral prosecution of its officials. Judges and prosecutors on the state level will know
the ranking public officials from their everyday dealings with them. Moreover, the local
judges and prosecutors are elected and would be concerned about upcoming elections and the
possible interference that a disgruntled official could create.
340 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1976). Subsections (b) and (c) of the statute govern the payment and
receipt of bribes:
(b) Whoever, directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of
value to any public official or person who has been selected to be a public official,
or offers or promises any public official or any person who has been selected to be a
public official to give anything of value to any other person or entity, with intent (1) to influence any official act; or
(2) to influence such public official or person who has been selected to be a
public official to commit or aid in committing, or collude in, or allow, any fraud, "or
make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States; or
(3) to induce such public official or such person who has been selected to be a
public official to do or omit to do any act in violation of his lawful duty, or
(c) Whoever, being a public official or person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives,
or agrees to receive anything of value for himself or for any other person or entity in
return for
(1) being influenced in his performance of any official act; or
(2) being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to collude in, or allow,
any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United
States; or
(3) being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of his official duty

Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or three times the monetary equivalent of
the thing of value, whichever is greater, or imprisoned for not more than fifteen
years, or both, and may be disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or
profit under the United States.
Subsections (0 and (g) of the statute govern the payment and receipt of illegal
gratuities:
(0 Whoever, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official
duty, directly or indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any public
official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official, for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official; or
(g) Whoever, being a public official, former public official, or person selected to be
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deemed to obstruct impartiality and public confidence in government. 34' The bribery statute was enacted in 1962 as part of a con-

flict-of-interest legislation package. 342 The bribery statute revision
purportedly "[substituted] a single comprehensive section of the
criminal code for a number of existing statutes concerned with bribery." 34 3 Congress intended this consolidation neither to make significant changes nor to restrict the courts' broad construction of the
present bribery statute. 344 The committee's object in drafting the
statute "was to bring uniformity into the law, both with respect to
the criminal conduct which constitutes bribery and the penalty for
the offense.

'345

One can see the bribery statute's underlying policy concerns by
examining its legislative history. 346 The courts have recognized these
concerns by promoting objective and independent government actions. As the courts have noted, "society deals sternly with bribery
which would substitute the will of an interested person for the judgment of a public official as the controlling factor in official
347
decision."
a public official, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of
official duty, directly or indirectly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by him ....
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two
years, or both.
341 President Kennedy eloquently expressed the need to uphold the public confidence in
government in a message dealing with the conflict of interest legislation. Noting the government's responsibility to maintain high ethical standards of behavior in government, the president stated:
[t]here can be no dissent from the principle that all officials must act with unwavering integrity, absolute impartiality and complete devotion to the public interest.
This principle must be followed not only in reality but in appearance. For the basis
of effective government is public confidence, and that confidence is endangered
when ethical standards falter or appear to falter.
I PUB. PAPERS 326 (1961) (President John F. Kennedy), reprinted in 107 CONG. REc. 6835
(1961).
342 Act of Oct. 23, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-849, 76 Stat. 1119 (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 201
(1976)).
343 S. REP. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprintedin 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3853.
344 Id.
345 107 CONG. REc. 14,778 (1961) (statement of Rep. MceCulloch).
346 Seegenerally Exec. Order No. 11,222, 3 C.F.R. 306 (Supp. 1965), reprintedin 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 201, at 274 (1969) (integrity and conduct in all official actions is vital to public trust); 1
PUB. PAPERS (President John F. Kennedy), supra note 341; S. REP. No. 2213, supra note 343.
347 United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 601 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2906
(1982); United States v. Muntain, 610 F.2d 964, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States v. Jacobs,
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II. ELEMENTS OF BRIBERY OFFENSE

A. Public Official
The person bribed in a section 201348 offense must have been a
public official, 349 a person who had been selected to be a public official, 350 or a sworn witness. 35 1 Section 201 provides similar penalties 35 2 for solicitation and receipt35 3 of bribes by these parties.
The courts have broadly interpreted the meaning of "public official." In United States v. Jennings 35 4 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a person charged under section
201 need not know that the bribee is a federal official. 3 5 In United
States v. Grffin, the United States District Court for the Southern Disthat a private corporation's president was a
trict of Indiana found
"public official.1 356 The court noted that, because the Department
431 F.2d 754, 759 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950 (1971) (quoting United States v.
Labovitz, 251 F.2d 393, 394 (3d Cir. 1958)).
348 See note 340 supra.
349 18 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1976) defines "public official" as "Member of Congress, the Delegate from the District of Columbia, or Resident Commissioner, either before or after he has
qualified, or an officer or employee or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or
any department, agency or branch of Government thereof, including the District of Columbia, in any official function, under or by authority of any such department, agency, or branch
of Government or a juror."
350 18 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1976) defines "person who has been selected to be a public official"
as "any person who has been nominated or appointed to be a public official, or has been
officially informed that he will be so nominated or appointed."
351 18 U.S.C. § 201(d) describes bribery of a sworn witness, which is not included within
the scope of this article.
352 See note 340 supra.
-353 The statutory language describing proscribed activity by the party receiving the bribe
includes "asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive." 18
U.S.C. § 201(c) (officials) and (e) (sworn witnesses). These subsections demonstrate the statute's broad scope. Assuming that the requisite mental intent exists (see notes 403-38 in/ra and
accompanying text), the statute covers both actual receipt of the bribe and mere solicitations.
The bribery statute contains no separate attempt section. Actual receipt of the bribe is not
necessary if the bribe has been "offered or promised" with the requisite intent to influence an
official act. SeeJacobs, 431 F.2d at 760.
354 471 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 935 (1973). The Court stated that the
conduct prohibited by the statute is the corrupt offer of "anything of value to any public
official. . . with intent to influence any official act." Id. at 1312. InJennings, the defendant
argued that he thought the official was a state official (police officer), rather than a federal
official (FBI agent). The court rejected this argument, but recognized that the offense required the official to have been a federal official. However, after viewing the statute's legislative history the court concluded that the sole scienter required is the corrupt nature of the
offer and "intent to influence [an] official act." Id. (citing 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3852, 3856).
355 471 F.2d at 1312.
356 401 F. Supp. 1222 (S.D. Ind. 1975), afd sub nom., United States v. Metro Management Corp., 541 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1976).
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of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had awarded Griffin an
area management broker contract, he was in a position of responsi3 7
bility, acting for and on behalf of HUD. 5
State employees involved with federal programs may also be section 201 "public officials." An interesting line of cases dealing with
this issue has evolved. In United States v. Del Toro ,358 Morales, a New
York city employee, was responsible for locating office space for a
new branch office of the federal "model cities" program. 3 9 Morales
arranged to have "model cities" rent buildings from prospective
landlords in return for payoffs. 6° The court found that Morales was
not a section 201 public official. The court reached this conclusion
even though the federal government had funded the entire cost of the
"model cities" program and provided 80% of its salaries, and though
36 1
HUD had partially supervised the activities.
In United States v. Loschiavo,362 the Second Circuit vacated Loschiavo's conviction for bribing Morales, whom the same court had
earlier held in Del Toro not to be a public official. The Second Circuit expanded upon its reasoning in Del Toro and noted that the most
significant factors in determining "public official" status are the
character and attributes of the employment relationship with the
63
federal government
Recently, in UnitedStates v. Mosley ,364 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that an Illinois Bureau of Employment employee working with the Chicago Comprehensive Employment and Training Program Act (CETA) was a section 201(a)
"public official." 365 The Seventh Circuit distinguished Loschiavo and
Del Toro on the grounds that neither of those cases had involved an
entirely separate statutory program.3 66 The Mosle court indicated
357 The court found Griffin to be a public official "acting for or on behalf of the United
States" for the purpose of the bribery statute even though Griffin acted as an independent
contractor and exercised no final judgment as to awarding jobs or paying contractors for
those jobs. 401 F. Supp. at 1230.
358 513 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1975), cer. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1976). The court noted that the
bribed "model cities" official was a city employee working under another city employee.
Three city agencies screened the bribed official's recommendations prior to HUD approval.
513 F.2d at 662.
359 Id. at 659.
360 Id.
361 Id. at 661.
362 531 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1976).
363 Id. at 661.
364 659 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1981).
365 Id. at 816. This state employment program was regulated by CETA.
366 Id. at 814.
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that the CETA program's provisions and history required substantial
federal government involvement. 367 The court found that this degree
of involvement was present; therefore, Mosley was a public official
"acting for or on behalf of the United States" Department of Labor. 368 The court listed three important factors for purposes of ascer-

taining whether Mosley was a "public official" under section 201(a):
(1) substantial government involvement in the program; (2) federal
objectives of the program; and (3) Mosley's responsibility to exercise
discretion to act for and on behalf of the government in administering federal funds. 369 The court combined these factors with section
201's purpose and broad construction to conclude that Mosley was a
370
section 201 (a) public official.
The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its position in United States v.
Hinton,3 71 where a community-based non-profit corporation's Executive Director and Housing Rehabilitation Coordinator were found to
be section 201(a) public officials. The court found that the Housing
and Community Development Act's statutory scheme in Hinton was
similar to the CETA plan in Moey .372 The court again found sub-

stantial government involvement in the program to be an important
factor, noting that the Act was intended to improve federal supervision over federal housing and urban development programs.37 3 The
court even characterized the defendants as "federal agents in the
sense of having discretion in administering the expenditure of federal
374
funds."
In United States v. Hollingshead,375 the Ninth Circuit followed the
Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Hinton and Mosley in holding a San
Francisco Federal Reserve Bank employee to be a "public official."
367 Id at 815.
368 Id. In examining CETA's legislative history, the court found congressional intent
"that the secretary have ultimate responsibility for assuring that manpower programs and
policies are carried out in accordance with the purposes and provisions of the Act." H.R.
REP. No. 659, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., repinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 2935,
2942.
369 659 F.2d at 814-16.
370 659 F.2d at 815-16. But see United States v. Hoskins, 520 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. 11. 1981)
(a state employee working for the Illinois Bureau of Employment Security was found to be
not working for or on behalf of the Secretary of Labor and' therefore not a § 201(a) public
official). The Mosl y court stated that it regarded the Hoskins decision as having been reached
incorrectly. 659 F.2d at 814 n.2.
371 683 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1982).
372 Id. at 197.
373 See S. REP. No. 693, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4273, 4274.
374 683 F.2d at 199.
375 672 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1982).
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Hollingshead's duties at the bank included soliciting and obtaining
bona fide competitive bids from qualified contractors for certain Federal Reserve Bank capital projects. 3 76 The court applied the Loschiavo test; looking at the character of the employment relationship
with the federal government, the court noted that Hollingshead
worked for a fiscal arm of the federal government. 3 77 Applying the
Mosley factors, the court noted: (1) the substantial government involvement in federal reserve banks; (2) the federal objectives of the
banks; 378 and (3) Hollingshead's authority to give recommendations
37 9
that resulted in Federal Reserve Bank approval for expenditures.
The court held that these circumstances were sufficient to find Hollingshead was acting for or on behalf of the federal government as a
section 201 public official.
These recent cases provide some guidelines to determine
when a person is acting "for or on behalf of the United States" as a
"public official" within the bribery statute. The tests applied in
these cases focus on the degree of government involvement in the
potential public official's activity and whether important federal
objectives are involved. This test leaves the courts a great deal of
discretion and promotes a broad interpretation of the "public official" requirement of section 201 bribery prosecutions.
B.

Oftcial Act

A section 201 bribery offense requires more than a public official's involvement; the official must also either promise the performance or be engaged in the performance of an "official act. ' 38 0 In
United States v. Birdsall,38 ' the Supreme Court of the United States
broadly construed this "official act" requirement, stating that the act
need not be prescribed by statute but may simply be a lawful requirement of the department under whose authority the officer was
acting.3 8 2 However, it is important to realize that the "public official" and "official act" requirements are interdependent, and both
376 Id. at 752.
377 Id. at 753. The twelve federal reserve banks are depositories for United States Treasury Currency. The banks also provide essential services for the Treasury. Id at 754.
378 Id
379 Id.
380 18 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1976) defines an "official act" as "any decision or action on any
question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending,
or which may by law be brought before any public official, in his official capacity, or in his
place of trust or profit."
381 233 U.S. 223 (1914).
382 The Court further stated that the requirement need not be prescribed by a written
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must be scrutinized to determine whether section 201 applies. Thus,
purely ministerial or low-level functions, even of government employees, will not usually constitute "official acts" because these per'383
sons are not section 201 "public officials.
Although an official act must be involved to sustain a bribery
conviction, the official need not personally perform, or even be capable of performing, the official act. 38 4 The statute proscribes influenc-

ing an official act,38 5 as well as being influenced in the performance
of the official act.3 86 The statute manifests congressional intent to

eliminate the temptation inherent in situations where federal officials
receive gifts or compensation. Even if no corruption is intended, a
donee may still tend to provide his donor preferential treatment, thus
leading to inefficient and patently unfair public affairs
management.3 8 7

The courts, following congressional intent, have also broadly interpreted section 201's "official act" requirement. In United States v.
Arroyo,388 the appellants propounded an interesting, although unavailing, argument based on the statute's "official act" language.
The appellants contended that they had not violated section
201(c) (1) because their solicitation had commenced after the public
rule or regulation, but might instead be a common practice or fixed duty of the department
involved. Id. at 231.
383 See general Krichman v. United States, 256 U.S. 363 (1921) (baggage porter of railroad under control of and being operated by the United States is not acting for the United
States in an official function, and therefore cannot be a "public official" performing an "official act").
384 The bribery statute includes attempts within proscribed conduct. Thus, the "bargained for" act need not be performed. See United States v. Arroyo, 581 F.2d 649, 653-55
(7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979); United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 479
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978); United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312, 332 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975); United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192, 197 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966).
385 18 U.S.C. § 201, which prohibits bribing federal officials, includes sections that prohibit influencing such a public official to commit a fraud on the United States (§ 201 (b)(2))
and inducing such person to violate his lawful duty (§ 201(b)(3)).
386 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) corresponds to § 201(b) and prohibits a public official from soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept a bribe.
387 572 F.2d at 480. The Evans court spoke of the judgment of the official being clouded.
Any outside influence (giving or receiving something of value) in performing official acts
should be viewed as inherently destructive to the orderly process of government. This principle is articulated in United States v. Booth, 148 F. 112 (D. Or. 1906), where the court stated
that to permit parties interested in the matters before government officers to pay agreements
for compensation for services would countenance the rendering of services oftentimes inconsistent with fidelity to the best interests of the government, to which the employee owes his first
and highest obligation. Id. at 116.
388 581 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979).
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official had completed his official act. The court relied upon the statutory language in rejecting this argument. The statute prohibits the
official from "being influenced in his performance of any official
act. 3 8s 9 The court noted that accepting the appellants' statutory interpretation would encourage the very conduct that Congress had
condemned. Under the appellants' interpretation, an official could
perform his official act and afterwards corruptly solicit or accept the
bribe by creating in the potential briber's mind the impression that
the official act had not yet occurred. 39° This interpretation loses
sight of the statute's purpose: to determine if a corrupt solicition has
been made. 39' The court discerned no congressional intent to exclude past acts. The Senate Report, 39 2 when the statute was enacted
in 1962, had manifested an intention contrary to that asserted by the
appellants. The report stated: "The term 'official act' is defined to
include any decision or action taken by a public official in his capacity
as such.

'393

In United States v. Carson,394 the Second Circuit followed this intent and held that an administrative assistant to Senator Fong of the
Judiciary Committee violated section 201 when the assistant received
money in return for requesting a Justice Department official to quash
an action pending before that department. The court delineated the
scope of an "official act" as "the corruption of official positions
through misuse of influence in government decision-making which
395
the bribery statutes make criminal.
In United States v. Mntain,396 the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit refused to extend section 201's
scope to include the misuse of public office and contacts gained
through that office to promote private ends. The Assistant Secretary
389 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) (1976).
390 581 F.2d at 653-54.
391 Id. at 654.
392 S. REP. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), reprintedin 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3852.
393 Id at 3856 (emphasis added).
394 464 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1972). A similar approach to Carson has been used in defining
"official acts" in United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 870
(1978) (HEW official with responsibility for student loan program received payments from a
private collection agency that had sought contracts for the collection of delinquent loans);
United States v. Arroyo, 581 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979) (loan
officer with small business administration paid by applicant for SBA loan); and United States
v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976) (administrator of federal
prison paid by son of prison inmate).
395 464 F.2d at 434.
396 610 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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for Labor Relations for the United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) was the defendant in Muntain.397
During his employment with HUD, Muntain had become involved
in a private scheme to sell group automobile insurance to labor unions as a negotiated benefit in union contracts. 398 He had often combined automobile insurance promotions with trips taken at
3 99
government expense for legitimate conferences with labor officials.
However, the court refused to hold that Muntain had engaged in an
official act, stating that no evidence had shown Muntain's insurance
discussions with labor officials had involved a subject that could
properly have been brought before Muntain in his official capacity.4°° The court labeled Muntain's activities "reprehensible," but
not criminal within section 201(g). 4 ' The court refused to construe
the statute in the manner the government advocated, which, as previously noted, would have prohibited using a public office to pro4 °2
mote private gains.
The Muntain court's "official act" interpretation was correct.
Congress intended the bribery statute to prevent a party from influencing an o7tial in his offiial duties. In this capacity, the public requires, and indeed demands, unbiased, informed decisions. The
bribery statute was not intended to encompass all public office misconduct. By refusing to expand the scope of "official act" to include
conduct outside official duties, the court followed the legislative intent to regulate only conduct directly connected with official duties.
C.

Intent

The fundamental difference between the bribery and illegal gra4 °3
tuity subsections of section 201 is the requisite degree of intent.
The bribery subsections (201(b)and (c)) specify that the act must
have been done "corruptly," while the illegal gratuity subsections
397

Id. at 965.

398 Id. at 966.
399 Id. at 966-67.
400 Id. at 968. The court, citing Birdsall, 233 U.S. 223 (1914), in a footnote, noted that
"official acts" included duties set forth in a job description as well as duties customarily associated with a particular job. However, the court found no evidence in the case to associate
Muntain's actions with his official or customary duties. 610 F.2d at 967.

401 Id. See note 340 supra.
402 610 F.2d at 967-68.
403 As noted in United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1974), "The different
and higher requisite degree of criminal intent, then, is the additional element which is essential to make the offense of bribery under section 201(c) (1) the greater offense in relation to the
lesser included offense of accepting an illegal gratuity under section 2 01(g)".

THE NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[June 1983]

(201 (f) and (g)) require an act to have been done "otherwise than as
provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or
indirectly."
A recent Second Circuit case involving an ABSCAM prosecution,40 4 United States v. Myers, °5 focused on the meaning of "corruptly" in subsections 201(b) and (c). The court examined a 1961
Report by the House Committee on the Judiciary 406 that emphasized that the purpose for which the recipient knows the bribe is offered or given determines the act's criminality. 40 7 This report
manifests a congressional purpose to apply a subjective intent test,
that is, to determine what the accused himself had intended. 40 8 In
UnitedStates v. Strand,40 9 the Ninth Circuit upheld the validity of jury
instructions that defined "corruptly" and the specific intent required
to act "corruptly" in a manner that required application of a subjec410
tive intent test.
As previously stated, the statute makes attempted bribery a
crime. Any offer or promise of a bribe, coupled with the requisite
intent "to influence an official act," constitutes bribery. 41 1 Proof of
an ability and desire to pay or receive the bribe establishes the requisite intent. 4 12 Of course, the official need not necessarily be corrupted, nor must the object of the bribe be attainable. 413 The official
may be entirely innocent and, since the bribe's payment and receipt
are independent offenses, 4' 4 the bribee's and briber's intents may dif404 See note 452 infra.
405 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982).
406 H. REP. No. 748, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1961).
407 Id.
408 See J. MARSHALL, INTENTION-IN LAW AND SOCIETY 108-16 (1968).
409 574 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1978).
410 Id. at 996. Accord, United States v. Johnson, 621 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Heffler, 402 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946 (1969); United States
v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966).
However, it is uncertain why Congress included the term "corruptly" in § 201(b) and (c).
See Comment, The Federal Bribey Statute.- An Argument for CautiousRevision, 68 Ky. L.J. 1026,
1037-38 n.54 (1979-80), which suggests that a statement by then Assistant Attorney General
Katzenbach may have been responsible: "The danger that innocent conduct may fall within
the provisions of proposed sections 201 and 202 may be avoided by the inclusion of a term
such as 'willfully' or 'corruptly' in subsection (b). 'Corruptly' is employed in title 18, United
States Code section 1503 and has never presented any serious obstacle to conviction." Federal
Confict of Interest Legislation." Hearingson HA 302, HR. 3050, HR. 3411, HR. 3412, and HR.
7139 Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on theJudicia, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 30, 36
(1961).
411 431 F.2d at 760.
412 Id.
413 Id. at 759-60.
414 United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1974),cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991

NOTE

[Vol. 58:1027]

fer. Thus, a section 201 bribery conviction requires separate proof of
both the bribee's and briber's intents.
An explicit quidpro quo is necessary to establish bribery. 41 5 In
addition, the briber must be the mover or producer of the official
act.41 6 United States v. Fenster4 17 provides an example of a quidpro quo
arrangement. Fenster offered payments to a United States Veterinarian Inspector with the expectation that more hogs would pass
inspection, less frequent production line shutdowns would occur, and
an overzealous inspector would be controlled. 4 1 The court held that
this exchange constituted the kind of quid pro quo arrangement that
419
established a section 201(b) violation.
,Although a bribery conviction requires an act to be done "corruptly," the corresponding gratuity sections require only that the act
be done "otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge
of official duty.

'420

In United States v. Brewster,421 the District of Co-

lumbia Circuit noted that the two clauses are not equivalents. "Corruption" bespeaks a higher degree of criminal knowledge and
purpose than does the corresponding gratuity language. 422 An official can accept something of value "otherwise than as provided by
law," yet not accept it "corruptly." Congress desired to prohibit
public officials from accepting things of value with either degree of
criminal intent and, therefore, legislated different requisite intents
and penalities for the offenses. 423 In UnitedStates v. Irwin ,424 the Sec(1975); United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d at 71; United States v. Michelson, 165 F.2d 732,
733 (2d Cir.), afd, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
415 506 F.2d at 72. Black's Law Dictionary defines "quid pro quo" as "giving one valuable thing for another. . . mutual consideration." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1123 (rev. 5th
ed. 1979).
416 506 F.2d at 72.
417 449 F. Supp 435 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
418 Id. at 438-39.
419 Id. Anotherquidproquo exchange resulted in a bribery prosecution in United States v.
Heffier, 402 F.2d 924 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946 (1969). Cecching, senior technician at
the Army Aviation Material Command, approached Eggart, a manufacturer, and offered, for
a fee, to insure that Eggart would be the successful bidder on contracts to be awarded by the
Air Force Material Command. Cecching made reports and recommendations in the performance of his duties that were likely to influence the contract awards. The court held Cecching's conduct to be the very kind of corrupt solicitation of official misconduct for value that
section 201(c) makes criminal. 402 F.2d at 926.
420 See note I supra.
421 506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
422 Id at 71.
423 Id. The court explains that Congress intended the gratuity subsections "to take care of
the case where the illegal payer offers a public official a gift for doing what the public official
is paid to do anyway. Both the giving and receipt of gifts for doing official acts are thus
forbidden." Id. at 72 n.26.
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ond Circuit held that, in a gratuity conviction, the government must
prove that the accused acted knowingly and purposely, and not
through accident, misunderstanding, inadvertence, or other innocent
reasons.

425

Another important aspect of the bribery/gratuity dichotomy involves the purpose in accepting or soliciting the thing of value. The
statute delineates the intent requisite to a bribery conviction. The
bribery subsections prohibit the receipt of anything of value "in return
for being influenced in [the] performance of any official act," while
the gratuity subsections prohibit the receipt of anything of value 'for
'42 6
or because of any official act performed or to be performed by him.
The bribery subsections' "in return for" language contemplates a quid
pro quo exchange. The gratuity subsections' "for or because of" language encompasses a wider range of situations.
Because the official may accept a gratuity for an act he has already perfomed, the statute contains no requirement of an exchange
or quidpro quo 427 A gift to an official for an act already performed
may thus fall within the scope of this section. As stated in United
States v. Evans,428 "specific intent is not an element of Section 201(g)
. . . the gravamen of each offense, then, is not an intent to be corrupted or influenced, but simply the acceptance of an unauthorized
compensation. '429 For example, goodwill gifts and favors to government officials that are motivated by a donor's generalized hope of
benefit will not satisfy the requisite intent for bribery, but will proba430
bly be construed to be an illegal gratuity.
424 354 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1965).
425 Id. at 197. The court noted that one may regard requiring the government to prove
this state of mind as either a degree of specific intent or as a limitation on the acts within the
purview of the subsections. Id.
426 See note 340 supra (emphasis added).
427 Id
428 572 F.2d 455 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978).
429 572 F.2d at 481. See also United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d at 72-74 n.26; United
States v. Umans, 368 F.2d 725, 728-30 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. dismissed, 389 U.S. 1025 (1967);
United States v. Forgione 487 F.2d 364, 365 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 976 (1974);
United States v. May, 175 F.2d 994, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
430 See United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1976), where the court held that
expenditures made in the hope that officials will be more likely to award government business
to the donor is an influence that does not amount to bribery. Id. at 735. This case is of
questionable importance, since the court based its decision on West Virginia's Bribery and
Gratuity statutes. W. VA. CODE §§ 61-5A-3 and 61-5A-6 (1977). The gratuity section provides for certain exceptions that are not considered to be illegal gratuities, including "trivial
gifts or gratuities involving no substantial risk of affecting official impartiality." Id at § 615A-6(b)(2). The federal statute provides for no such exceptions. For a discussion of "good-
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In UnitedStates v. Umans,43 l the Second Circuit described the illegal gratuity subsections as "[making] it criminal to pay an official a
sum which he is not entitled to receive regardless of the intent of
either payor or payee with respect to the payment. '432 As noted in
Brewster,433 this statement (as well as the previously quoted statement
in Evans) 43 4 could mean that the Second Circuit has interpreted the
gratuity subsections to require no intent whatsoever. The Brewster
court did "not necessarily disagree" with this analysis when the recipient was an Internal Revenue agent or other appointed official, but
when an elected public official was involved, the court found a practical need for a criminal intent requirement under the gratuity
43 5
subsections.
The section 201 bribery subsections apply where a specific intent, which the statute describes as "corruptly," can be established.
Since "corruptly" does not appear in the unlawful gratuity subsections, those subsections carry a less formidable burden of proof and
encompass a wider variety of situations. Further, due to the severity
of the bribery penalty, which includes possible exclusion from public
office upon conviction, 436 the courts may more willingly convict on
illegal gratuity charges. Thus, the unlawful gratuity subsections
must be broadly construed 43 7 to accomplish their manifest legislative
purpose: to maintain high ethical standards of behavior as government becomes more complex and involves more private sector
contact.

438

will" gratuities, see Perry, The Fuzzy World of Illegal Gratuities, DISTRIcT LAWYER, June/July
1979, at 25, 26-27.
431 368 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1025 (1967).
432 Id. at 730.
433 506 F.2d at 73 n.26.
434 572 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1978).
435 506 F.2d at 73 n.26. The court explained that some criminal intent must be required
when applying the statute to an elected public official's acts. Every campaign contribution is
probably given to an elected public official because of some acts already done or to be done
by the official. The donee at least supports the acts of this official. If no intent requirement
was presumed under the gratuity subsections, then great difficulty would arise in applying
these subsections to elected public officials, for no distincion would exist between an illegal
gratuity and a legitimate campaign contribution. Id.
436 See note 340 supra.
437 United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d at 480; United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d at 333;
Parks v. United States, 355 F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir. 1965).
438 See S. REP. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3852-53.
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Defenses

A. Entrapment
The entrapment defense focuses on the defendant's predisposition to commit a crime. 43 9 Entrapment occurs when a defendant
who is not predisposed to commit the crime does so as a result of
government inducement. 440 The inquiry does not focus on government conduct, but is a subjective inquiry into the defendant's predisposition. If the court finds that the defendant was predisposed to
commit the act, the entrapment defense does not apply.44
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
noted in United States v. Anderton, 442 if the defendant is eagerly waiting
to violate the law, a criminal in search of a crime, then government
actions merely assisting him to that end are irrelevant. 443 Thus, a
government agent's single offer or solicitation of a bribe will not automatically establish entrapment. 444 Rather, a court must find that
the defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime with which
he has been charged, but did so only after government inducement.
B.

Outrageous Conduct

The accused invokes the outrageous conduct defense to bribery
when he asserts that the conduct at issue violates the fifth amendment due process clause's constitutional standard regarding "immutable and fundamental principles of justice." 44 5 This defense differs
from entrapment because the inquiry centers on the amount and nature of government conduct, not on the defendant's state of mind.
In UnitedStates v. Russell,44 6 the Supreme Court recognized that
this defense was plausible, stating "the conduct of law enforcement
agents [may be] so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to ob439 See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S.
484 (1976). In Russell, Justice Rehnquist commented that "[e]ntrapment is a relatively limited defense [rooted] . . . in the notion that Congress could not have intended criminal punishment for a defendant who has committed all the elements of a proscribed offense, but was
induced to commit them by the government." 411 U.S. at 435.
440 United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 597 (3d Cir. 1982).
441 Id
442 679 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir. 1982).
443 Id. at 1201.
444 See United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1170-72 (2d Cir. 1980).
445 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 176 (1952) (pumping petitioner's stomach violated due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
446 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973).
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tain a conviction. '447 Courts have hesitated to reverse a conviction
or dismiss an indictment based on outrageous government conduct. 448 In United States v. Twzgg, 44 9 the Third Circuit accepted this
due process defense. However, because of the substantial government involvement and enticement in Twigg, one should not read this
case to signify broad judicial acceptance of the outrageous conduct
450
defense.
The Third Circuit subsequently refused to accept the outra452
45
geous conduct defense in United States v. Jannotti, ' an ABSCAM
case involving illegal bribes. The court distinguished Twigg on two
grounds. First, inJannotti,the government had provided neither material nor technical assistance to the defendants, as it had in Twigg.
Instead, the government merely created the fiction that it sought to
buy the officials' influence.4 53 Second, injannotti, the government
was not involved in both the buying and selling sides of the transac447 The issue arose three years later in Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976). A
majority of the Court (with three dissenting and two concurring Justices) rejected the position
that the entrapment defense is the only available defense where "the Government has encouraged or otherwise acted in concert with the defendant." Id at 492 n.2. The court noted
that the entrapment defense focuses only on the defendant's predisposition to commit the
crime. Where this predisposition is established, the defendant cannot rely on government
misconduct in asserting the entrapment defense. Thus, the outrageous conduct defense is
wholly separate from entrapment.
448 The Third Circuit's statements in United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 2906 (1982), illustrate the court's view regarding this defense. The court
noted "[w]e must necessarily exercise scrupulous restraint before [denouncing] law enforcement conduct as constitutionally unacceptable. . . ." Id. at 607-08. Only the most intolerable government conduct will merit this constitutional defense. See also United States v.
Esquer-Gamez, 550 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1977) (due process challange to undercover agent's
encouragement rejected even though one defendant was solicited twenty times before committing an offense); United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 926 (1978) (due process challenge rejected even though the defendant was tempted
by a million-dollar cash deal and prodded by veiled threats).
449 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
450 In Twig, the government assisted the two defendants in setting up a narcotics laboratory. The government supplied glassware and phenyl-2-propamone, an indispensible ingredient. The government agent purchased practically all of the supplies and was completely in
charge, furnishing all the laboratory expertise. Neither defendant had the knowledge with
which to manufacture methamphetamine. When the defendants encountered problems in
locating a production site, the government provided an isolated farmhouse well-suited for the
laboratory operation. Id at 380-81.
451 673 F.2d 578, 608 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2906 (1982).
452 ABSCAM (short for Abdul Scam) was an FBI undercover operation involving Congressmen and public officials. The two-year investigation started in the world of white-collar
crime, but expanded into a massive corruption probe that eventually involved even United
States Senators. See R. GREENE, THE STINGMAN 5 (1981).
453 673 F.2d at 608.
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According to the court, the govern-

ment's activities injannotti failed to rise to a level that violated the
defendants' due process rights.
Appellants in other recent ABSCAM prosecutions have also
raised the outrageous conduct defense. ABSCAM was an unconventional "sting" operation involving substantial government participation and direction. 4 55 Despite this excessive government
involvement, several courts have upheld the ABSCAM prosecutions
against outrageous conduct arguments.

456

In UnitedStates v. Myers, 4 5 7

the Second Circuit held that the due process limit on governmental
participation in crime, although not clearly established, was not
reached in ABSCAM. 458 The court allowed the government agent's
conduct in ABSCAM, which it saw as bare suggestions to a Congressman that he take a bribe, because the public had the right to expect
its public officials to have sufficient integrity to refuse such suggestions. 459 The Myers court did not think that the government's con-

duct in ABSCAM had approached the "outrageous conduct" that
46 °
the courts had discussed in Hampton and Rttssell.
The Supreme Court has never specifically upheld the outrageous government misconduct defense. 46 1 Although Hampton and
Russell have failed to define "outrageous" government conduct, these
cases provide the only guidance available until the Supreme Court
provides a definition. Courts that continue to follow the imprecise
statements these cases have provided will probably continue to re454 Id
455 Robert C. Stewart, the attorney in charge of the Newark Strike Force, noted ABSCAM's unique nature. Stewart saw a fundamental difference between the subject matter of
a conventional sting operation and that of ABSCAM. In a conventional operation, the subject matter (such as a stolen television) is contraband and incriminating per se. Any discussion involving the item's disposition therefore provides a basis for further investigation. In
ABSCAM, there was nothing inherently illegal about the general topic of conversation. The
officials were not incriminated by simply having been offered the bribe. Thus, the opposite
presumption (of legality) must operate in ABSCAM. The decision for further investigative
action must then rest on other facts and inferences. United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363,
371-72 (D.D.C. 1982) (citing Meyers due process exhibit 15 at 3-4).
456 See notes 452-55 supra and accompanying text. But see United States v. Kelly, 539 F.
Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1982) (virtue testing in ABSCAM exceeded the concept of fundamental
fairness where the government persisted after the Congressman had initially rejected the illegal offer).
457 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982).
458 Id at 837.
459 Id at 843.
460 Id
461 United States v. Marcello, 537 F. Supp. 1364, 1369 (E.D. La. 1982).
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strictively construe the "outrageous government misconduct"
defense.
C.

Vagueness and Overbreadth

Courts have held that section 201 is neither overbroad nor impermissibly vague. 462 The statute's standards are not vague, for they
are sufficiently explicit to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory application. 46 3 The statute also provides a person of ordinary intelligence
a reasonable opportunity to know what acts are prohibited so that he
may act accordingly. 464 The courts have determined that they
should construe the statutory language, particularly the words "corruptly," "value," and "influence," in their ordinary, everyday
4 65

senses.

A clear and precise enactment may nevertheless be overbroad if
it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct. 466 Section 201 has
consistently withstood this constitutionally based attack, 467 since the
statute's possible overbreadth must be judged in relation to its
plainly legitimate sweep.A8
C. Speech or Debate Clause
A senator or representative indicted for bribery may raise the
defense of immunity under the speech or debate clause of the Constitution. That clause provides: "[F]or any speech or debate in either
house, they [senators or representatives] shall not be questioned in
462 See, e.g., United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
948 (1976); United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v.
Irwin, 354 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966); United States v. Passman,
460 F. Supp. 912, 914 (W.D. La. 1978).
463 United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d at 77.
464 Id at 77 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)). The Grayned
Court delineated three important values that vague laws offend. First, laws must provide a
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what acts are prohibited, so
that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may not provide such fair warning. Second, to
prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, laws must provide explicit standards for
those who apply them. Third, a vague statute related to first amendment freedoms may
inhibit the exercise of these freedoms. 408 U.S. at 108-09.
465 See United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d at 76-77; United States v. Pommerening, 500
F.2d 92, 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1088 (1974); United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d at
197; United States v. Passman, 460 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. La. 1978).
466 See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1967) and cases cited therein. See generally
Note, Campaign Contributionsand FederalBribery Law, 92 HARV. L. REv. 451 (1978).
467 Brewster, 506 F.2d at 77; Irwin, 354 F.2d at 196; Passman, 460 F. Supp. at 914.
468 506 F.2d at 78 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)). The
Broadick Court noted that this principle becomes most important when conduct, rather than
mere speech, is involved. In such a case, the overbreadth must be real and substantial. Id
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any other place. '469 In UnitedStates v. Johnson ,470 the Supreme Court
held that the speech or debate clause precludes judicial inquiry into
the motivation for, as well as the content of, a Congressman's
speech. 47 1 However, in affirming Senator Brewster's conviction in
United States v. Brewster,472 the Supreme Court stressed the clause's
limitations. The clause does not protect all conduct relating to the
legislative process; it protects only those acts that are clearly a part of
473
the legislative process.
United States v. Helstoski4 74 involved a former Congressman who
had been charged with taking bribes to help enact certain legislation.
The Supreme Cout held inadmissible not only evidence dealing with
the proposed legislation's actual introduction, but also "evidence of
discussions and correspondence which describe legislative acts. '475
However, the Court held that the clause's protection extends only to
an act that has already been performed. 476 A promise to deliver a
speech, to vote, or to solicit other votes at a future date is not "speech
477
or debate"; a promise to introduce a bill is not a legislative act.

Therefore, underHelstoski, future acts and promises to act are outside
the clause's protection. However, even after Helstoski, the scope of
the speech or debate clause in the criminal context, including bribery
478
prosecutions, is unresolved.

469 U.S. CONST. art I, § 6. See generallv Note, Stautog-Proposalfor Case-by-Case Congressional
Waiver of the Speech or Debate Pnvilege in Bribery Cases, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 465 (1982).
470 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
471 Id at 185. The court injohnson expressly left open the clause's applicability to a prosecution which, though possibly entailing inquiry into legislative acts or motivations, is founded
upon a narrowly drawn statute that Congress passed to regulate its members. Id The
Supreme Court also refused to resolve this issue in United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477,
492 (1979). See Note, The Bribed Congressman'sImmuniorom Prosecution, 75 YALE L.J. 335, 34748 (1965).
472 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
473 Id at 515-16. The Court, in examining the clause's history, noted that the clause was
intended to protect the legislative branch's independence, not to immunize members of Congress from criminal responsibility. Id
474 442 U.S. 477 (1979). For a good discussion of the speech or debate clause and its
application in Helstoski, see Note, Evidentia7 Implications of the Speech or Debate Clause, 89 YALE
L.J. 1280 (1979).
475 442 U.S. at 486.
476 Id at 490.
477 Id
478 The Brewster Court noted that "taking a bribe is, obviously, no part of the legislative
process or function; it is not a legislative act." 408 U.S. at 526. Of course, taking or giving a
bribe is not conduct that the speech or debate clause protects. The clause may thwart the
prosecution of this conduct by rendering essential evidence inadmissible. The Court has
firmly established that evidence of past legislative acts is inadmissible. However, because
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IV.

Conclusion

The federal bribery statute effectively deters and punishes bribery involving public officials. Since its enactment, the statute has
been broadly interpreted to effectuate this purpose. If courts continue this broad interpretation and Congress is receptive to further
bribery legislation, the statute's purpose of assuring the public's trust
and confidence in government will be fulfilled.
E.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Conflicts of interest occur when motives other than fulfilling official responsibilities taint a government official's performance.
These conflicts can arise when an official advances his own or an
affiliate's interest, when an official assists a private party or receives
compensation from a non-government source or does both, and when
an ex-government official works for a private party against the government after leaving public employment.4 7 9 For years, Congress
and the states48 0 have struggled to deal with conflicts of interest in all
areas 48 ' of government. 48 2 Although numerous statutes exist, a select
few dominate conflict of interest prosecutions.
Recently, the government has become extremely sensitive to the
revolving door between employment in the public and private sectors.48 3 When their employees leave for related private employment,
government agencies often become vulnerable to the ex-employee's
expertise and knowledge. Well-intended attempts to limit abuse,
clarify officials' duties, 484 and determine which situations constitute
bribery often involves a promise to act or to refrain from activity, such conduct is not within
the speech or debate clause under the holding in Hestoski.
479 For a broad discussion of conflict of interest theory, sec R. AXELROD, CONFLICT OF
INTEREST: A THEORY OF DIVERGENT GOALS WITH APPLICATIONS TO POLITICS (1970); R.
PERKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAw (1963).
480 Segenerall#Hall, OiftialMisconduct Under the Arkansas Criminal Code, 30 ARK. L. REV.

160, 176 (1976); Shapiro, The Post-Employment Restrictions of the Ohio EthicsLaw: PriorPracticeand
Recent Amendments, 7 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 913 (1980); Comment, Legislative Conftcts of InterestAn Ana~'ysis of the PensylvaniaLegislative Code of Eics, 19 VILL. L. REV. 82 (1973).
481 See general.y R. GETZ, CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS; THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST ISSUE
(1966); R. VAUGHN, CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST IN THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE BRANCH (1979).
482 See generally B. MANNING, FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAw (1964); R. PERKINS,
supra note 479.
483 See Kessinich v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 684 F.2d 88, 98 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
484 See, e.g., Note, The Fiduciag, Duty of Former Government Employees, 90 YALE L.J. 189
(1980).
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conflicts 48 5 partially offset the benefits 486 (and, some claim, necessity) 487 of the revolving door. By offering invaluable experience, the

government attracts both enthusiastic young professionals and highlevel experts from the private sector. The government thereby provides quality work product, and the public as well as the employee
profits from the revolving door. To facilitate this use of experts and
consultants, Congress has distinguished "special Government employees," who may be excused from or subject to only limited restric488
tions under the federal conflict-of-interest laws.
Congress has directed its revolving door legislation at executive
branch and independent agency employees. 48 9 This conflict of interest provision disqualifies ex-officials, including ex-special employees,
from representing anyone but the United States in matters on which
the ex-officials had worked personally and substantially while with
the government. 49° Furthermore, Congress prohibits an ex-official,
for two years after leaving government employment, from communicating or appearing before an agency or department concerning any
matter that had been pending under his official responsibility. 49 1
Whenever a department has "a direct and substantial interest" in a
matter, Congress restricts an ex-employee's communications to the
department on that matter. In such instances, however, the special
government employee receives special consideration. 492 Violations of
the revolving door legislation are punishable by imprisonment, a
fine, or both. 493 Because of their nature, these statutory violations

often involve violations of the American Bar Association's Code of
485 See Department of Energy v. Brimmer, 673 F.2d 1287, 1292-94 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1982).
486 See Guiletti, Disqualijfing Former Government Lawyers, 7 LIIGATION, Winter 1981; T.
Morgan, Appropriate Limits on ParticipationBy a FormerAgency Ofcial in Matters Before an AgenCy,
1980 DUKE L.J. 1.
487 See Mundheim, Confict of Interest and the Former Government Employee: Rethinking the Revolving Door, 14 CREIGHTON L. REv. 707 (1981).
488 18 U.S.C. § 202 (1976) (defines "special Government employee"). Individual conflict
of interest statutes limit their own application to "special Government employees."
489 See 18 U.S.C. § 207 (Supp. V 1981).
490 See 18 U.S.C. § 207(a) (Supp. V 1981).
491 See 18 U.S.C. § 207(b) (Supp. V 1981). A refusal does not remove a matter from
within an official's responsibility. United States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. 402, 407-09 (N.D.
Ill. 1982).
492 See 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) (Supp. V 1981). On the other hand, § 207 broadly includes an
ex-official's partners within its scope. Id § 2 07 (g). See also Note, Ethical Problemsfor the Law
Firm of a Former Government Attorney: Firm or Individual Disqualifwations, 1977 DuKE LJ. 512.
493 Violations of § 207 may result in imprisonment for not longer than two years, a fine of
not more than $10,000, or both. An agency head may also extend a suspension period for up
to five years. 18 U.S.C. § 2070) (Supp. V 1981).
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Professional Responsibility. 494
Conflict of interest violations often occur with bribery offenses as
well. 495 These conflicts occur when an official has abused his presently held position. Congress has attacked such conflicts in all three
branches of government 49 6 through two statutes which proscribe similar conduct. 49 7 A third, related statute applies only to executive
498
branch and independent agency employees.
Under these statutes, federal officials may not receive compensation from non-government sources in exchange for services49 9 the officials performed while acting in their official capacities. 50 0 Without
regard to compensation, Congress has also largely prohibited federal
employees from simply assisting or advising private parties in matters
in which the United States has a direct and substantial interest. 50 1
Additionally, executive branch and independent agency employees
may not receive non-government, supplemental income for services
performed for the United States (not the income source). 50 2 While
special government employees are subject to the full scope of the
compensation-services exchange restrictions, they are excluded from
the supplemental income provisions50 3 and only partly subject to the
private assistance restrictions. 50 4 Despite their close relationship to
bribery, these conflicts of interest are easily distinguishable on the
elements because they require no corruption on the public official's
494 See Dorfmian, 542 F. Supp. at 410; MORGAN, supra note 486, at 30.
495 See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982), petitionfor cert. lied, 51
U.S.L.W. 3567 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1983) (No. 82-1255).
496 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 203 (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 205 (1976) (both statutes apply to officials
and employees of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches). Section 203 includes officials-elect within its coverage.
497 NMyers, 692 F.2d at 857 (struggles to distinguish § 203 and § 205-§ 205 requires formal
involvement of the government official while § 203 covers even informal involvement).
498 See 18 U.S.C. § 209 (Supp. V 1981).
499 The term "services" is liberally construed to include mere advice. M ers, 692 F.2d at
856-58.
500 See 18 U.S.C. § Z03(a) (1976). Section 203 requires only that the official receive compensation in connection with the performance of an actual or contemplated "official duty.
United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34, 43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 78 (1982).
Neither an act nor specific intent is required, and the official's and compensator's intents may
differ. United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 480 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978).
501 See 18 U.S.C. § 205 (1976). Section 205 does not require that the employee advise the
private party on a matter that is related to the employee's official duties. United States v.
Bailey, 498 F.2d 677, 679-80 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
502 See 18 U.S.C. § 209 (Supp. V 1981).
503 See 18 U.S.C. § 209(c) (1976).
504 See 18 U.S.C. § 205 (1976).

THE NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[June 1983]

behalf.505
Both the compensation-services restrictions and the supplementary income provision provide for prosecution of the public official
and, unlike the assistance restrictions, the non-government associate
(the party paying the compensation) as well. 50

6

Convictions for re-

ceiving compensation in exchange for services or for unlawfully assisting a private party may result in punishments identical to the
revolving door punishments. However, supplemental income violations carry only half the potential penalty of the conflict-of-interest
violations. 50 7 Furthermore, an official convicted of receiving compensation for services will be barred from holding any position of
50
honor, trust, or profit under the United States.
In an effort to stifle conflicts of interest at an early stage of development, Congress has banned executive branch and independent
agency employees from participating in official government business
when the employees have an opportunity to advance their personal
interests thereby. 50 9 The statute likewise restricts special government
employees. 5 10 Personal interests include an official's spouse's, children's, and partner's interests. 5 11 The personal interest disqualification becomes especially important in government contracting when
the official has an interest in the other party to the contract. Any
such interest disqualifies the official from participating in the
contract.

5 12

The punishment for violating the personal interest disqualifica51 3
tion is identical to the punishment for revolving door violations.
However, unique to the personal interest restriction, an official may
avoid disqualification if he fully discloses his interest to his superior
505 United States v. Raborn, 575 F.2d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 1978); Evans, 572 F.2d at 480
(both cases distinguish the elements of bribery and conflicts of interest).
506 See 18 U.S.C. § 203(b) (1976). United States v. Carpentier, 689 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3509 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983).
507 Section 203 and § 205 convictions may result in imprisonment for no more than two
years, a fine of not more than $10,000, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 203 (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 205
(1976). See note 493 supra and accompanying text. Violations of § 209 may result in imprisonment for not more than one year, a fine of not more than $5,000, or both. 18 U.S.C.
§ 209(1) (1976).
508 See 18 U.S.C. § 203 (1976).
509 See 18 U.S.C. § 208 (Supp. V 1981).
510 Id
511 See 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (Supp. V 1971).
512 See United States v. Irons, 640 F.2d 872, 878 (7th Cir. 1981).
513 Section 208 violations are punishable by no more than two years in prison, a fine of no
more than $10,000, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (Supp. V 1981). See note 493 supra and
accompanying text.
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and the superior determines that the interest will not affect the integ5
rity of the official's work.

14

Conflicts of interest will affect the integrity of officials' work in a
number of combinations in any number of circumstances. Yet, the
primary step in combating conflicts of interest, defining exactly what
constitutes a conflict, may be the most difficult step. Because of continued disagreement over the definition of a conflict of interest, the
applicability and compatibility of the federal restrictions will shift as
they are adjusted in the future.
F.

RICO

Although generally categorized as an "organized crime" statute,5 15 RICO can also be used to combat corruption in government. 5 16 Essentially, RICO can be applied to government cases by

defining an agency or government office as an "enterprise." 5 17 To
514 See 18 U.S.C. § 208(b) (Supp. V 1981).
515 See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 584 (1981). RICO is an acronym for
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations. RICO is found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(1976). For a general discussion of RICO, see Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Inftenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminaland Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009
(1980). For a discussion of RICO's application to white collar crime in general, including
government corruption, see White-Collar Crime: A Survey of Law, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 169,
308-20 (1980) and White-Collar Crime: Second Annual Survey of Law, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 173,
351 (1981).
516 See note 517 infra. See also Blakey, The RICO Civil FraudAction in Context: Reftections on
Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237, 268 & n.93 (1982).
517 United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1982) (en bane) (Thompson II)
(operating Tennessee governor's office to obtain bribery and extortion); United States v.
Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23 (2d Cir.) (RICO applied to extortion in connection with the running of
the New York City Circuit Court), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1442 (1981); United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1981) (RICO applied to fixing of traffic ticket by ajudge),cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1451 (1982); United States v. Lee Stoller Enters., Inc., 652 F.2d 1313 (7th
Cir.) (sheriff found guilty on RICO charges for taking kickbacks from prostitutes and for
skimming money from his deputies' association), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 636 (1981); United
States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239 (4th Cir.) (state senator held guilty of RICO violations for
bribery in connection with his state senate seat), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 396 (1981); United
States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1981) (various officials of the Florida state courts
found guilty of selling justice and seizing marijuana under RICO); United States v. Clark,
646 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1981) (Arkansas county judge found guilty under RICO for taking
kickbacks and bribes in office); United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1980) (RICO
applied to sheriff's office); United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5 (4th Cir. 1980) (West Virginia prosecuting attorney held guilty under RICO for gambling violations); United States v.
Karas, 624 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1980) (RICO applied to bribery and misuse of offices by county
law enforcement officials), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981); United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d
1060 (4th Cir. 1980) (sheriff guilty under RICO of taking bribes from prostitutes); United
States v. Bacheler, 611 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1979) (employees of the Philadelphia traffic court
found guilty of taking bribes under RICO); United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682 (7th
Cir. 1979) (police officers convicted under RICO of using office to obtain bribes and sexual
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discover how RICO may be used in government cases, the statute
must be briefly examined. Then, the statute's application to government by including agencies and offices within the statutory term "enterprises" may be examined.
I.

RICO Summarized

RICO has three major divisions. First, RICO defines several
key terms and, then, based on these definitions, prohibits various activities relating to corrupt and corrupted organizations. Second,
RICO establishes a unique two-tier system and liberal court procedures. Finally, RICO mandates liberal construction of the statute by
the courts.
Section 1961(a) defines "racketeering activity" in terms of a
wide range of state and federal crimes: predicate offenses. 5 18 These
favors), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir.
1977) (massive corruption in the Pennsylvania Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage Taxes);
United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977) (protection racket run through city
police department), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978); United States v. Dozier, 493 F. Supp.
554 (M.D. La. 1980) (employees of the Louisiana Department of Agriculture convicted under
RICO); United States v. Barber, 476 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. W.Va. 1979) (motion to deny a
RICO charge for defining the West Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission as an
enterprise denied); United States v. Sisk, 476 F. Supp. 1061 (M.D. Tenn. 1979) (lower court
opinion in Thompson); United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1979), af'dnmem.,
605 F.2d 1199 (1979) (traffic court judge receiving kickbacks from employees and bribes from
defendants), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1980); United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp. 195
(E.D. Pa.), afJdmem., 588 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1978) (member of the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority convicted of taking bribes to fix city contracts through RICO). See also
Maryland v. Buzz Berg Wrecking Co., 496 F. Supp. 245 (D. Md. 1980) (civil suit against
various government officials and private parties for rigging bids for city demolition contracts).
Contra United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976), rev'd other grounds, 591 F.2d
1347 (4th Cir.), rev'den banc, 602 F.2d 653 (4th.Cir. 1979) (governor of Maryland charged with
corruption in office).
518 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) states:
'racketeering activity' means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following
provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section
224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472 and 472 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable
under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension
and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions),
section 1084 (relating to transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to
obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement),
section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section
1952 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954
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range from traditional, state-defined felonies (murder, arson, and
robbery among others) to federal statutes relating to embezzlement
from pension and welfare funds.519 Section 1961(5) goes on to state
that a " 'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two [racketeering acts listed in § 1961(1)], one of which occurred after [1970]
and the last of which occurred within ten years . . .after the commission of a prior act . . .. 520 A person engages in a pattern of

racketeering activity by committing two of the predicate offenses
listed in section 1961(c) within a period of ten years.
Section 1962 proscribes a range of corrupt practices. It is unlaw52 1
ful for any person to:
a) use or invest income derived from a pattern of racketeering
ac522
tivity in any enterprise engaged in interstate commerce;
b) acquire or maintain an interest in or control
over an enterprise
523
through a pattern of racketeering activity;

c) conduct the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity;5 24 or

525
d) conspire to any of the above.

The statute thus envisages four forms for the relationship between a
person and the enterprise: the enterprise may be the ,person's victim,
526
prize, instrument, or agent.
Violation exposes the perpetrator to both criminal and civil penalties. In a criminal action, the court may fine a defendant up to
(relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate
transportation of stolen property), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic),
(C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186
(dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section
501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving
bankruptcy fraud, fraud in the sale of securities or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic
or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States ....
519 18 U.S.C. § 664 (1976). These statutes include the Hobbs Act, see part C supra, the
Travel Act, see part A supra, and bribery, see part D supra.
520 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976).
521 "Person" is also a defined term. " '[Pierson' includes any individual or entity capable
of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property. . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1976).
522 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976). "Enterprise" is defined by § 1961(4) as "any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity ..
523 Id § 1962(b).
524 Id § 1962(c).
525 Id § 1962(d).
526 See Note, RICO andthe Predicate Offenses- An Analysis of DoubleJeopard and Verdict Consisteng Problems, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 382 (1982).
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$25,000 and/or impose a prison sentence of up to twenty years. 527

Furthermore, conviction mandates forfeiture to the United States of
any interest acquired or maintained through a pattern of racketeering activity. 528 In addition, the court may use such restraining orders
"as it shall deem proper. ' 529

In civil cases brought under RICO, both the Attorney General
and private plaintiffs may obtain injunctions ordering the defendant(s) to: divest themselves of any interest in any enterprise, restrict
future activity, dissolve or reorganize any enterprise, and/or conform
to any other orders of the court. 5 3 0 Private parties may recover treble

damages, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees. 53 ' Private plaintiffs
may also make use of RICO's collateral estoppel clause: final judgments or decrees in criminal cases estop the convicted from con53
testing issues settled in the criminal case.

2

Ancillary procedural sections provide liberal venue 533 and process

534

rules. Civil actions may sometimes be expedited, if "of general

public importance," 535 and proceedings may be closed. 536 Section
1968 establishes rules and procedures of "Civil Investigative
Demand."537
Lastly, Congress provided that courts should liberally construe
538
RICO in order to effectuate its remedial purposes.
II.

Government as "Enterprise"

Defendants object to RICO's application to corruption cases by
claiming that the section 1961(e) definition of "enterprise" does not
include a government agency. These defendants cite the definition
itself, legislative history, congressional policy, and various rules of
527
528

18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976).
Id § 1963(c). If this interest is not exercisable or transferable for value by the United

States, it shall expire and shall not revert to the convicted person. Id.

529 Id § 1963(b).
530 Id § 1964(a).
531 Id § 1964(c).
532 Id § 1964(d).
533 Id § 1965(a) (in "any district in which [the defendant] resides, is found, has an agent,
or transacts his affairs").
534 Id. § 1965(b)-(d) (nationwide in some cases).
535 Id § 1966.
536 Id § 1967.
537 Id § 1968 (this provision has never been used because of Department of Justice
guidelines).
538 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, § 904(a), Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 947
(1970).
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construction. A flood of cases has rejected these arguments. 53 9
The starting point in every case involving the construction of a
statute is the language itself;5 40 therefore, the first line of analysis here
is RICO. Section 1961(4)541 does not, prima fade, exclude govern-

ment agencies; in fact, the definition includes government agencies in
two ways. 542 First, a government agency could qualify as a "legal
entity" described in the first clause. A government agency is an entity 543 and it is, by definition, legal. Second, the agency or those cor-

rupted within it could be classed as a "group of individuals
associated in fact" under the second clause (both clauses result in the
same remedial options).
Nothing within the definition itself would prevent either construction. Nor does either reading create internal contradictions
within RICO. 544 The liability and procedural provisions function
perfectly well in government agency cases. While certain remedies
may not be applicable in government agency cases, 545 courts may
merely read those sections to be inapplicable under those conditions.
In short, allowing government agencies to be "enterprises" in RICO
cases does not strain the statute.
In addition, restricting RICO to non-government cases would
misread the legislative history and the congressional policy expressed
546
therein and in the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA).

Although the legislative history only scantily covers this question, several illuminating items indicate general congressional policy.
Senator McClellan, the chief sponsor of OCCA and the chairman of
the committee that drafted it, declared that:
To exist and to increase its profits.

. .

organized crime has found it

necessary to corrupt the institutions of our democratic processes,
something no society can tolerate.

.

.

. For with the necessary ex-

pansion of governmental regulation of private and business activity,
its power to corrupt has given organized crime a greater control
539 See note 516 supra.
540 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
541 See note 522 supra.
542 For somewhat different analysis, see Blakey, supra note 516, at 268 n.93 & 299 n. 158.
543 "Entity" is defined broadly in United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 30-31 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1442 (1981).
544 The Supreme Court has stated that, in construing statutes, "absurd results are to be
avoided and internal inconsistencies in the statute must be dealt with." United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981).
545 See, e.g., United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 43 (1981) (Friendly, J., concurring).
546 RICO is Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452,81
Stat. 922 (1970) (partially codified in 18 U.S.C.). See Blakey, supra note 516, at 268 n.93.
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Others echoed this same concern. Senator Murphy noted that "organized crime flourishes only where it has corrupted local officials."'548 Representative St. Germain even told the House that
"[t]he greatest danger from organized crime lies not in its provision
of illegal goods and services, but in its penetration of the country's
legitimate institutions .

.

.

. One of the most ominous statistics

turned up by the President's Crime Commission in their surveys was
the estimated $2 billion paid out each year by organized crime to
public officials in and out of the criminal justice system to buy im'549
munity from the law."
This concern for the viability of all levels of government in the
face of a sustained and well-financed attack by organized crime also
appeared in the OCCA. In the OCCA's "Statement of Finding and
Purpose," Congress made several fact findings, including a recognition that organized crime "subvert[s] and corrupt[s] our democratic
550
processes."
Preventing application of RICO to government agencies would
subvert these findings and policies by limiting RICO's coverage to
only one part of the problem it was designed to remedy. While Congress did not expressly include government agencies in section
1961(4), the statute's general language and policy indicate that government agencies may be considered "enterprises."
The federal courts have accepted the more liberal view towards
section 1961(4).551 Most recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en bane, upheld the application of
RICO to government cases in UnitedStates v. Thompson.552 The government had charged the governor of Tennessee (and others) with
conspiring to conduct the affairs of the office of the governor of Tennessee through a pattern of racketeering activity.5 53 All defendants
pled guilty but appealed the legality of the indictments, challenging,
'554
the classification of the governor's office as a RICO "enterprise.
A Sixth Circuit panel reversed on the grounds that the broad reme547 115 CONG. REC. 5874 (1969).
548 116 CONG. REc. 962 (1970).
549 116 CONG. REc. 35,199-200 (1970).
550 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970).
551 See note 517 supra.
552 United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993 (6th Cir.) (en banc) (Thompson II), rev'g 669
F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1982) (Thompson I).
553 685 F.2d at 994.
554 Id at 995.
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dial provisions of RICO indicated the statute should not apply to
government agencies. 555 The panel's decision was the first court of
appeals decision to refuse to hold that governmental units could be
"enterprises."5 56
The full Sixth Circuit rejected the panel's reasoning and upheld
the indictments. 557 The court based its decision on the broad statutory language of section 1961(4), the near unanimity of the judicial
precedent, and the legislative history. 558 The court decisively held
559
that a government agency could be an enterprise under RICO.
The court did, however, question the prosecutorial decision to
define the governor's office as the "enterprise." The court felt this
560
form of indictment threatened the comity of federal-state relations.
This was particularly important to the court because of the availability of substitute language the court thought would avoid this problem. 5 61 According to the Sixth Circuit, the government could just as
easily have defined the defendants themselves as the enterprise (an
association in fact).562 The court did not consider the limit on the
scope of the remedies available to the government and any private
563
plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court has never ruled on the application of section 1961(4) to government agencies. In United States v. Turkette,564
however, the Court considered a related question-whether an enterprise could be an illegitimate or illegal organization as well as a legal
entity.
The Court decided that "enterprise" could include illegitimate
organizations. According to the court, the statutory language plainly
included both sorts of organizations. 565 Structurally, the expansive
reading of the definition did not result in any internal incongruities
or ambiguities in the statute.5 66 (If it had, presumably the Court
would have ruled the other way.) Moreover, the Court felt that
incongruities would be created by a restrictive reasoning because of
555
556
557

Thompson I, 669 F.2d at 1150.
See note 517 supra.
Thompson II, 685 F.2d at 994.

558 Id
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566

Id
Id at 994-95.
Id at 995.
Id at 1000.
Id at 1001.
452 U.S. 576 (1981).
Id at 581-82.
Id at 582-83.
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the logic of the statute and the legislative history. 56 7
The Court also dismissed application of rules of construction to
section 1964(4).568 Such rules, it noted, -are used only as a sort of
legal last resort when the statute is ambiguous and section 1961(4)
contains no such ambiguity. 569 Use of the rules might conflict with

the liberal construction clause as well.
III. Conclusion
Indictments and complaints including RICO counts may properly allege government agencies or offices as "enterprises" as required
by the liability provisions of section 1962.570 Section 1961(4) permits,

on its face, such a construction. This construction creates no structural difficulties throughout the rest of the statute. Also, RICO's legislative history does not rule out government agencies serving as
section 1961(4) "enterprises." In fact, permitting government agencies to be called "enterprises" fulfills the overall policy behind RICO.
Courts overwhelmingly agree that RICO can properly be applied to
government offices and agencies.
Randy j Curato
J. Dan'el McCune
Kenneth F.Plifa
A. Joseph Relation
Stephen T Toohill

567 Id. at 588-93.
568 Id at 582.
569 Id
570 Constitutional and prudential considerations may limit RICO's applicability to state
government. Among these possible limitations could be the tenth amendment (preventing
Congress from interfering with the states' regulation of their own integral state functions.
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)); the eleventh amendment (preventing suits against states in federal courts, but limited by waiver and the Ex parte Young (209
U.S. 123 (1908)) line of cases, which limits eleventh amendment immunity to state officials
acting only in their official capacities); separation of powers; comity; and federalism. To date,
these limitations have not been of great importance in the reported cases, although the court
in Thompson II did express some concern over disruption of federal-state comity. 685 F.2d at
994-95. The court considered and dismissed tenth amendment problems. Id at 1001.

